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Guest Editor: Angelina Stanojoska

MIGRANT AND REFUGEE CRISIS IN EUROPE: WAS THE PANDORA'S BOX OPEN?





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Editorial

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MIGRANT AND REFUGEE CRISIS IN EUROPE: WAS PANDORA'S BOX OPEN?

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Movement has been part of human history; it is and has been integrated inside every human, becoming active as a result of various factors which at a moment are more or less dominant in one's life. It is like a code written down in everyone's DNA, making humans unable or better said "hungry" to be free and always look for better. Starting in March 2010, the Arab Spring opened a door for the biggest migration flow in modern history. Such as conflicts were crossing borders from one state to another in the fight for democracy and freedom from regimes, as domino effect migration did the same. Numbers increased every day and during 2015, in time of Syrian crisis, we were witnessing a mayor migration flow to Europe since the European colonization and the Transatlantic Slave Trade.

Mentioning the theory of push and pull factors as a starting point, although it has been used to explain the everyday movement of people, victims of human trafficking, towards rich countries which at the end become their countries of destination in the labyrinth of exploitation, lured by stories of well-paid jobs and good life, it can also be discussed in the context of migration movements during the 2015 and the beginning of 2016.

Pushed by terror and war and pulled by the possibilities for a better life, a chance to stay alive, hundreds of thousands of people have fled their countries of origin and moving through the Balkan migration route are already inside or in front of the European Union's doors. Moving through Turkey, Greece, Macedonia, Serbia to Croatia, Slovenia, Austria or Germany; or to Hungary, Austria, Germany or Sweden (or other EU Member State), some of them managed to get at the end of their destination, some of them were smuggled, some trafficked, unfortunately some ended their journeys among the waves of the Mediterranean Sea or some stayed into metal fences "hugs".

During this global movement with so wide framework, several categories of people were put in the same basket, not even making an effort to draw a line between migrants and refugees. And it was the first important step for additional solutions. Instead of being practical, the EU became an ignorant and selfish entity, lost in its quarrels between member states. Some started opening their borders wide, not thinking of tomorrow and others started building fences, locking up people and feeding them in a way even animals should not be fed. Was this the Union which arose from the ashes of the bloodiest war in human history? Or every atom of humanity was lost in the games of political intrigues and different interests?

The protection of refugees has many aspects. It includes safety from being returned to the dangers they have fled; access to asylum procedures that are fair and efficient; and measures to ensure that their basic human rights are respected to allow them to live in dignity and safety while helping them to find a longer-term solution. States bear the primary responsibility for this protection. UNHCR therefore works closely with governments, advising and supporting them as needed to implement their responsibilities (UNHCR 2016). Migrants choose to move not because of a direct threat of persecution or death, but mainly to improve their lives by finding work, or in some cases for education, family reunion, or other reasons. Unlike refugees who cannot safely return home, migrants face no such impediment to return. If they choose to return home, they will continue to receive the protection of their government. For individual governments, this distinction is important. Countries deal with migrants under their own immigration laws and processes, but countries deal with refugees through norms of refugee protection and asylum that are defined in both national legislation and international law (UNHCR 2016).

Starting with Lombroso's *homo criminalis* where immigrants were part of the analyzed possible criminals, through the Chicago School, whose conclusions were that foreigners have powerful criminal tendencies, immigration has always been connected to crime, trying to divide societies into "us" and "them", leave newcomers at the margins, exclude them and if possible, try to push them away. And today, the word *immigrant*, although being a bit wide (all foreigners with no importance of their ethnic, social, economic or professional background), always is narrowed into a direction in which it points out to those non - citizens who are not white, are poor, have no working skills, are coming from non - developed or developing countries, they will just steal our jobs or will be begging on the streets, and in worst cases will bring diseases etc. It is a picture of threatening asylum seekers, Muslim terrorists, Balkan "barbarians", criminal immigrants who will only destroy what we have worked for centuries (Stanojoska 2016).

It is a modern fear wrapped in classical paper, that fear from strangers explained through sociological perspectives or as Garland (2001) says that all those others are endangering what we have and that our society should protect itself from their "vicious" attacks, rather than to think what to do afterwards in the need to rehabilitate everything they'll destroy. It starts with Durkheim's theory of anomie and his opinion of strengthening bonds and solidarity among individuals in the society and ends with Merton's strain theory. Namely, in his works, Emile Durkheim speaks about punishment seen as an element or mechanism which helps into building and maintaining social solidarity and structure, so using it the community will try to push aside and suffocate all those foreign elements trying to threat local ones. Using such measures excludes immigrants who cannot "put their hands" onto cultural goals with their "*instrumentum operandi*", so being at the edge of survivor, their changing their "*modus operandi*" using different, in most cases unaccepted cultural means (Stanojoska 2016).

Robin Cohen (1994, 189) called this groups "third world immigrant" or "helots"; that is those immigrants who, in addition to being deprived of many rights enjoyed by citizens - principally, the right to vote and be elected - are in much worse situation than other foreigners in a given receiving country because they belong to an ethnic minority, are unskilled, and are poor. The difference between foreigners coming from poor and rich countries is also manifested in the enforcement of controls over borders: states do not distribute burden evenly.

Foreigners coming from different parts of the globe are treated differently concerning formal and informal practices - visa requirements, restrictions on the right to entry and stay, enjoyment of civil rights, and judicial and extrajudicial treatment (Aliverti 2013).

And at the end there is always a difference between “crimmigrants” or those seen as a danger, undocumented, maybe terrorists, people with criminal background) and “travelers (*bona fide*) or people who are privileged and can move without problems (Franko Aas 2011). The word “crimmigrant” is coinage and as a term originates from the words criminal and immigrant, and is used in purpose to describe the perception of immigrants and today, refugees coming from Arab countries, as potential criminals (Stanojoska 2016).

The migration route is a path which moves on the same steps as the one of organized crime. A migration flow is like an open market for smugglers who can sell their products (in this case the possibility to get out of conflict zones and then get in the EU). Smuggling of migrants, but also trafficking in human beings is out there, on those paths, living among people’s destinies, becoming their everyday life.

As the European Union Member States acted on the rivers of people, their path changed into the quest of salvation. In 2012, Greece finished its fence on the border land with Turkey, migrants and refugees started moving using Bulgaria (from Turkey). When, in 2014, Bulgaria finished its fence on the border with Turkey, people started using the Eastern Mediterranean Route to get to European land (from Izmir and Bodrum to Kos and Lesbos) and afterwards the Western Balkan Route to EU. After this path became alive, some Member States started building fences on their borders. At first Hungary built fence on its border with Serbia which moved migrants and refugees to Croatia (and then Hungary). Making such step was an alarm for Hungarian authorities who continued building fences, this time on the border with Croatia, which influenced another change of paths towards Slovenia. During the period of free movement towards EU countries, mostly Germany and Sweden, there were times of barriers on the borders between Croatia and Slovenia, which eventually culminated with barriers between Austria and Slovenia. Closing of the Western Balkan Route, without having another effective solution just opened another routes for such organized crime groups, which continued to use another path towards EU. Possible alternative routes are those from Greece towards Italy after crossing the Mediterranean Sea, or from Greece to Albania crossing the Adriatic Sea, or from Egypt towards Lampedusa in Italy or even from Turkey crossing the Black Sea towards Bulgaria or Romania.

In other words, it would be something as the British ex-prime minister Mrs. Thatcher once bluntly put it, “we joined Europe to have free movement of goods (...) I did not join Europe to have free movement of terrorists, criminals, drugs, plant and animal diseases and rabies and illegal immigrants” (Eriksen 2007).

Criminal networks are typically composed of several key individuals. The organizer or leader of the network is usually located in a key migration hub and is responsible for the overall coordination within the network. Members of migrant smuggling networks typically work autonomously with a number of lower-level contacts who are part of their personal network. Low-level contacts are used as drivers, crew members, scouts, or recruiting agents. These contacts typically operate as part of a network only for a limited time and are exchanged regularly. Migrant smuggling networks are flexible and adapt to changing business demands by relying on auxiliary members as necessary.

These auxiliary members act as money handlers, guarantors or forgers. These individuals provide services to the network, but do not form part of networks' core memberships (Europol 2015).

March 18th will be known as one of the days when the EU once again has shown its two faced game in this migration flow to its territories. Although Germany was the loudest promoter of giving shelter to refugees inside EU, at the end this whole charade of one for all, 28 for themselves, ended with an EU - Turkey Agreement, which should end migratory movements to EU. The two most important points accented with this Agreement should help the Union to stop movement towards its territories. Namely, every irregular migrant crossing from Turkey to Greece or found on Greek territory will be returned back to Turkey and for every returned migrant with Syrian origin, the EU will accept another Syrian who is in Turkey. Seen through prism of humanity, we do not get a solution, because the Agreement will just worsen things up, which is already happening with people living in tents in subhuman conditions on the Greek - Macedonian border and of course, with an increased number of asylum applications in Greece which stops the returning of irregular migrants. Is this the Europe we all dreamed off? Or is it just a dream, as it is for refugees and immigrants?

Also, being in the prism of interest, but also happening, terrorism is a phenomenon directly connected to ISIS and Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. Penetrating in Turkey, through the shape of the Kurdish Workers' Party, terrorism has never been more alive and breathing at the doorstep of the European Union. Fear is associated with opinions declaring that using refugees many ISIS members will enter the Union, many sleeper cells among Europe will be awoken and will commit terrorist attacks in European metropolitan areas as revenge and part of the Holy War against infidels. Paris and Brussels will always be engraved in our memories as examples of how long can ISIS's hands be, and which consequences the so called "zombie" politics can suffer common European citizens.

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***About the Guest Editor:**

Angelina Stanojoska graduated at the Police Academy - Skopje (2008), received her MSc in Criminology and Criminalistics at the Faculty of Security - Skopje (2011) and her PhD in Security Sciences also at the Faculty of Security - Skopje (2014). At the moment she is an Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Law, University “St. Clement of Ohrid” - Bitola, Republic of Macedonia. She has written a significant number of articles, has been part of many scientific conferences and international courses. During 2016 she used the Erasmus Basileus staff exchange scholarship at the Faculty of Law, University of Lund, Sweden. Her main interest is in the area of criminology, especially the intersection between migration and crime, and human trafficking.



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FROM HOME SAFETY TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: HOW ITALIAN TALK SHOWS FRAMED MIGRATION AFTER THE PARIS ATTACKS

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Abstract

*This article investigates the migrants' representation in the Italian talk shows and how new reading frames are developed after the Paris terrorist attacks in November 2015. The theoretical framework is composed by studies on migrants' representation in media. After recognition of all the primetime Italian talk shows that have been broadcasted in the period between 14 November 2015 and 14 January 2016, we have chosen three: *Ballarò*, *Quinta Colonna* e *Piazza Pulita*. The selected corpus has been analyzed using the typical tools of the content analysis as investigation applied to the narrative-conversational structure of talk shows.*

Key words: migration; talk show; media representation; terrorism; social inclusion

INTRODUCTION¹

This article aims to analyse how the image of migrants in Italian television has changed after two important events where foreigners threatened European cities' safety. On 13 November, 2015, suicide bombings and mass shootings killed 130 people in the streets of Paris. Since an Islamic State militant group claimed responsibility for the offence, the climate of fear linked to international terrorism fed by *Charlie Hebdo* shooting was magnified. On the

¹Although this article is the result of a joint research effort of the three authors, Melissa Stolfi wrote Sections 1 and 3, Alessandro Ricci wrote Section 2, and Giovanni Brancato wrote Sections 4 and 5.

New Year's Eve, numerous sexual assaults were reported in Germany, mainly in Cologne, and men of Arab or North African appearance were indicated as perpetrators. European citizens' security was now threatened not only by organized terrorists, but also by isolated foreigners. The common trait was the belonging to "the Arab world", and therefore to Islamic religion.

ISLAM AS A UNIVERSE OF MEANING

After the *Charlie Hebdo* shooting, there were undoubtedly huge changes in the media representation of Islam as a universe of meaning, affecting that of the flow of immigrants coming to Europe. For universe of meaning, we intend to share a culture, language, religion and practices. As far as we know, events like Paris and Cologne can polarize public opinion and generate a sense of distance (Saeed 2007) between two different cultures, separating the public's perception of a social phenomenon into an unproblematic "Us" and an unfamiliar, distant "Them" (Bourdieu 2001). The juxtaposition of "we versus them" became stronger in 1989, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, when the division brought by the Iron Curtain was gone and the world returned to a cultural distinction, no longer based on economic systems, but rather on cultural universes (Marletti 1995). Thus, the public started to talk about Islam concerning the recent *ethnicization* of conflict - Muslims become enemies because of their religion rather than their different ethnic culture.

This return to bias based on ethnicity seems to be rather unusual, especially in a world that is based on a globalized economy. In fact, paying attention to the economic side, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the world started moving toward a reduction of barriers, at least in terms of goods (Sardar 1999).

Moving to the media representation's territory, it is interesting to analyse the Van Dijk's perspective on the revival of inter-ethnic relations and racism in the media. The media discourse on racism, is now acknowledged that the concept of this feeling being a form of domination spreads from a negative characterization in the public discourse, which comes from the white elite in Western European countries. In fact, non-Europeans are often described not only in consideration of physical attributes, but even more on a cultural base, so it would be correct to consider this phenomenon a matter of "ethnicity". It builds fence between the in-group and out-group, shaped by religion, culture and language (Van Dijk 1991). This idea is linked to what Said (1978) calls *Orientalism* and its definition of "in" and "out-group", and is connected to ethnicity as a social system based on ethnic characteristics perpetrated by the Western white majority.

Following this path, one would assume that ethnicity is consolidated by stereotypes built up over the years and, above all, must be reproducible to continue their function. Examples of reproduction of stereotypes are the media (Bourdieu 1973). They have a strong position concerning the transmission and articulation of speeches that represent minority groups such as migrants (Cottle 2002; 2006). In support of this thesis, taken up by other scholars, it is argued that the media often act like an elite that sends messages, under its cultural hegemony (Zelizer and Allan 2002; Poole and Richardson 2006).

In summary, the three key ideas that emerge in the relationship between media and immigration are the presence of stereotypes, their reproducibility and the dramatization of events typical of media logic, in this case leading to misrepresenting the image of immigrants.

This trend is often found in the agenda setting of media reporting facts related to migrants only in a negative meaning or focusing on illegal and deviant behaviour. Moreover, we certainly cannot underestimate the framing of the news. Thanks to this process, events are placed in a broader context of meaning and linked to other events, thanks to semantic references (Goffman 1974), and Entnam (1993) argues that the framing technique is the selection process of some aspects of perceived reality to make them more salient in a communicative text.

The media representation of Islam in Italy has been characterised by some vices, distortions and mystifications. Italian media tend to represent this “alien” world as monolithic, not plural and poor of cultural experience (Binotto and Martino 2004) and to narrate Islam as a world from which most migrants originate, thanks to a repetition of stereotypes. Because of their pervasive development, the role of the media is critical in building a public sphere in the dialogue and the development of an intercultural society (Musrò and Parmiggiani 2014). In particular, Binotto (2004) introduces the concept of emergency leading to two different frameworks: the humanitarian and the securitarian one, both linked to an exceptional situation. Therefore, this representation provides not only the concept of emergency, but, also, a polarization of public opinion. Over these two frameworks we can recognize two types of immigrants, the ones to help and the ones to reject. The securitization process transforms discursively immigration to a security problem and the migrant in a potential criminal (Cutitta 2012). In securitarian terms, migrants are classified into one category and labelled as outcasts or even dangerous individuals for the society. This causes a person’s depersonalization process, ignoring the individual and relegating him symbolically in the legal category of non-person (Dal Lago 1999).

The immigrant imagined by the media is usually a desperate person and therefore potentially dangerous, bearer of problems and degradation, so that words as “immigration” and “landings” are brought into the field of emergency thanks to the link with terms like “invasion”, “despair”, “crime” and even “terrorism” (Colombo 2012). According to Dal Lago (1999) this particular asset undertaken by the Italian media would contribute to circulation and confirmation of a kind of fear that derives from the link between terrorism and immigration, expressed in reference to the foreign presence in Italy as a grey area where Islamic fundamentalists could be hidden (Binotto and Martino 2004).

THE MIGRANTS’ REPRESENTATION IN THE ITALIAN MEDIA

The data collected by *Carta di Roma* in the *Third Report* show that in 2015 there was a increase of different informative products – newspapers and TV programs - which have talked about immigration. In the first ten months of 2015, there are about 3.437 news dedicated to this topic, the highest number in the last 11 years of survey (Associazione Carta di Roma 2015). News items related to migration are a simple and immediate way to add it on the agenda; moreover, immigration is set on the top of the Italian media and political agenda because of the exponential growth of migrant flows that involving Italy in the last year. But as for any topic, immigration is told in different manner by the media (Sciortino and Colombo 2004a; 2004b; Bruno 2008; Morcellini 2011, 2013). From the studies conducted by *Carta di Roma*, we can identify three main frames which is themed the migration: hospitality, security and terrorism.

The *hospitality frame* includes all the debates focused on the problems and the possible solutions related to the integration of the *foreigner*. The *security frame* is connected to arguments concerning crime, social, political and economic instability perceived as a result of migration flows. The *terrorism frame* refers to the tendency to create links between immigration and the roots of Islamist terrorism on the territory of Occidental States (Associazione Carta di Roma 2015).

The main theme is *Fear*, the feeling shared by the three frames proposed. This could have several meanings: fear due to the lack of safety on the streets, fear due to the inefficient politics that is not able to administrate the country, fear due to the lack of cooperation between the European States for the resolution of problems.

The research carried out by the *European Observatory on Security* proves that the way in which media speak about fear is central in encouraging fear itself: since tv discourses are built on the *us-them* opposition (Benveniste 1974), individuals could be led to read the migration in a logic exclusion rather than inclusion.

Speaking of frame construction, the Carta di Roma report shows that, compared to the analysis carried out in 2007 and 2009, in 2015 there is an important change: the replacement of duo *immigrant-criminal* with *immigrant-competitor* (Associazione Carta di Roma 2015).

In earlier years, mass media have told about news items and immigrants in terms of ethnicity and religion (for example, media underline ethnicity or credo of criminals). Nowadays, with the worsening of living conditions, people believe that immigration is one of the causes of economic crisis, unemployment, social and political problems of Italy (for example media speak about immigration, reforms, unemployment, social inclusion at the same time and in the same space).

In both periods, media system has described migration leveraging on *security frame*, but shifting between two different meanings: in the past, security was related to crime and daily life of people; now it should be interpreted in its wider meaning, as connected to the incompetence of the State to restore geopolitical balances. This puts the current situation into the profound break between East and West cultures.

According to Marletti (1995), it is not possible to talk about migration without contextualizing the topic with current events. During 2015, immigration received permanent coverage, and episodes linked to it have been emphasized as relevant news items. The year begins with the *Charlie Hebdo* shooting that leads to the preliminary combination of terrorism and immigration. But media system has been using *terrorism frame* to influence public opinion for a short time, since the high number of landings and the sea slaughters induced to emphasize the *hospitality frame*.

From February to June, the increase of incomings forces European Union to plan a strategy of cooperation to help Countries – Italy first of all – that are most affected by the migrant flows. Immigration reaches a large visibility thanks to lots of informative products talking about it in connection with the tragedy of the Sicily Canal on 18 April². The closing of borders by some European members, the inefficiency of Triton Operation to control borders in Mediterranean area lead to both a permanent coverage of immigration issue and a narration in terms of hospitality from the media for a good part of the year.

² The night of 18 April 2015 the shipwreck of an Eritrean boat caused the death of about 800 migrants trying to arrive in Italy. The incident is considered one of the worst maritime tragedies of the Mediterranean in recent years.

In September, the publication of the picture of Aylan Kurdi, the Syrian child found dead on a Turkish beach, produced lots of new discussions about immigrants and policy options in European Union both in public sphere and media space.

Since October, issues regarding national politics such as “Mafia Capitale”³, “Vatileaks 2”⁴, and the resignation of the Major of Rome, Ignazio Marino, took the place of immigration into the informative products. This situation continues until the terrorist attacks of Paris on 13 November, after which the media treated again immigration using the *terrorism frame*. Now, the latter is the main reading frame adopted by Italian media; but, after the sexual assaults in Cologne, it is mixed with *hospitality* and, in particular, *security frames*.

THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING TV TALK SHOW

Since immigration has become a leading issue, political leaders have been called to speak about this issue in TV talk shows. Talk shows try to rebuild settings similar to the spaces of viewers’ experience. In this way, home-viewers feel more involved in the interaction and are influenced by the guests’ opinion (Pezzini 1999). The discursive interaction is the narrative engine of these format: the exchange of points of view, the conflict, the polarization of positions, but also the role of guests and hosts are essential to define the interpretative frames used (Ruggiero 2014). Thanks to the framing, talk show is able to influence viewers’ opinions. The attention given by talk shows to immigration depends on the particularity of the issue that is able to polarize guests’ opinion during the interaction and to build a functional debate into the program.

To investigate the migrants’ representation in the Italian talk shows, we made a recognition of all that programs that have been broadcasted in prime time on so-called “generalist” channels, in the period between Friday, 13 November 2015, and Friday, 15 January 2016⁵.

The large number of TV shows that have dealt with the immigration issue albeit with a frame different from the one presented before the Parisian tragic events. Only in the analysis’ early stage, it was also examined *Quarto Grado* - an Italian talk show in prime time, which usually takes up almost exclusively of current events relating to disappearances and cases of crime news. On 13 November, because of being aired in the same hours of the Parisian attacks, a part of the program has been exceptionally dedicated to breaking news, including debates with in studio guests, telephone calls and video reports by experts and journalists from the French capital. After the “emergency”, the TV show returns almost completely to its typical connotation, although with some episode segments dealt with terrorist attacks in the French streets and at the Bataclan theatre.

In the primetime talk shows aired after the Paris events, the issue of immigration has been the main theme. In some of these cases it was the only subject of the episode, and only a few times it was a topic discussed marginal than others. The quick response of the television medium to the disruptive power of breaking news has been made possible on the one hand thanks to the special newscast and, the other hand, thanks to the subsequent schedule changes.

³ The inquiry about supposed association between politics, business and organized crime, operating in Rome since 2000.

⁴ The inquiry based on confidential information leak in Vatican.

⁵ *Ballarò* (RaiTre), *Dalla Vostra Parte* (Rete4), *DiMartedì* (La7), *La Gabbia* (La7), *PiazzaPulita* (La7), *Porta a Porta* (RaiUno), *Quarto Grado* (Rete4), *Quinta Colonna* (Rete4), *Virus – Il contagio delle idee* (RaiDue). In the same period was aired a single episode of *In Onda* (La7), but it dealt with issues far from that of interest in this study.

Only two of the selected talks (*DiMartedì* and *La Gabbia*) didn't realize any special episode. Four of them have transmitted one special television episode (*Ballarò*, *Dalla vostra parte*, *Piazza Pulita*⁶, *Porta a Porta*). *Virus-Il contagio delle idee* transmitted two episodes.

The TV broadcasting schedules analysis has identified two different periods during which almost all of the primetime talk shows' agenda was related to immigration, although presenting it in two different frames. The first period is between the beginnings of the analysis, the day after the Paris attacks, up to the Sunday, 6 December 2015. The second one goes from the week following New Year's Eve, specifically from 4 January 2016, coinciding with the emergence of news concerning the acts of violence that took place in Cologne, up to the end of the analysis.

We have proceeded with a further selection that allowed us to choose three talk shows: *Ballarò*, *Quinta Colonna* e *Piazza Pulita* - are primetime TV format transmitted respectively on RAI3, Rete4 and La7. In the typologies identified by Haarman (1999), they fall into the *issue-oriented format* category: two or more guests express their opinions on current issues that are considered more important by the public, while the TV presenter manages the interaction between all participants. Here, the pluralism is ensured through the presence of guests with different opinions, often highly polarized, that can be represents different interpretations of the speech's subject (Pezzini 1999).

First period: after the Paris attacks

Since the terrorist massacres of 13 November, the national media analyze the migration phenomenon in the Islamic international terrorism frame. However, it is not easy to identify the different frames used because of the many hours in live television that dealt with this topic. In this first period, it is almost impossible to argue about immigration in terms of hospitality, but it is "normal" the drift towards the international security issue: Third World War became increasingly a real possibility. This is clear examining the same title of the 19 November episode of *Piazza Pulita* ("The evil's roots"), and the video caption of *Quinta Colonna* aired 23 November ("The terror alert in Europe and security in Italy").

Table 1: Talk shows episodes between the next day Paris attacks and first week of December 2015.

Date	Talk show	Title/Themes of episode
16/11/15	Quinta Colonna	"Paris Attacks"
17/11/15	Ballarò	Terrorism, security, ISIS, war, Jubilee
19/11/15	Piazza Pulita	"The evil's roots"
23/11/15	Quinta Colonna	"The terror alert in Europe and security in Italy"
24/11/15	Ballarò	Terrorism, security, ISIS, war, immigration, taxes
26/11/15	Piazza Pulita	"The end of innocence"
30/11/15	Quinta Colonna	"Alarm terrorism and security in the country a few days before the opening of the Jubilee"
01/12/15	Ballarò	Terrorism, security, ISIS, war, immigration, economy, Vatileaks, retirement benefits, eighteen-year-old bonus, taxes
03/12/15	Piazza Pulita	"The Wall"

⁶ *Piazza Pulita* also broadcasted an Islamic State video-report in the late evening, after the end of the weekly regular primetime episode, on January 7, 2016.

In the first period, the episodes are almost entirely focused on Islamic terrorism at the international level (Table 1): starting from the Paris events and passing through the Bamako hotel attack in Mali. However, we can see as the narration of these events arises, in particular, from the element of possible “proximity” of the topic. On the one hand we talk about violence in the streets of France, our “cousin” country, and the death of a young Italian scholar, Valeria Solesin, who has become a simulacrum of “foreign invasion”. On the other hand, the imminent opening of the Jubilee in Rome becomes the perfect place for a future terrorist attack against his own best interests. These are just some of the themes that underpin the television public debates. The effective possibility of an international conflict is the element of the common background to all examined talk shows. This topic is become even more nearby to the “common sense”. It has been possible thanks to the choice to deal with it within television arenas, usual to debate about taxes, retirement benefits and the labor market. The issues related to the socio-political national life, together with economic ones, gave rise to public television debate during the period from 7 December 2015 and 5 January 2016, where the migration topic has been almost totally abandoned (Table 2).

Table 2: Talk shows episodes in the middle analysis period between the first week of December and the New Year’s Eve.

Date	Talk show	Title/Themes of episode
07/12/15	<i>Quinta Colonna</i>	“Christmas will be, once again, skinny and poor for most of the Italians”
08/12/15	<i>Ballarò</i>	Jubilee, Vatileaks, ISIS, populism, economic crisis, banks, retirement benefits, world of work, taxes
10/12/15	<i>Piazza Pulita</i>	“Cheated”
15/12/15	<i>Ballarò</i>	Banks, Renzi government, taxes, retirement benefits
17/12/15	<i>Piazza Pulita</i>	“The panther”
22/12/15	<i>Ballarò</i>	Renzi government, banks, taxes, world of work, tax evasion

Here, media agenda topics were strictly focused on political and policy issues: citizens’ security relating to Jubilee opening ceremony, extra-parliamentary debates about 2016 Law of Stability⁷, and “Save-Banks” legislative decree⁸.

Second period: after the sexual assaults in Cologne

Since the beginning of 2016, the immigration issue has returned central in the Italian talk shows debates because of New Year's Eve sexual assaults in Cologne. In addition to the security frame, a new one is added to the migration phenomenon: social inclusion. As an important international issue, social inclusion has always been considered crucial, because it's based on cultural differences related at religious and political reasons that can have consequences on international social equilibrium. In this context, television arenas were focused on dichotomy of the women socio-cultural image, particularly in the differences between the East and the West. In using it as a frame for immigration topic, the focus in the

⁷ The financial law regarding terms for the formation of the annual and multi-annual State budget.

⁸ The government has allocated a fund to resolve a crisis regarding four banks: Banca Marche, Banca Etruria, Carife, and CariChieti.

media debates was placed on a sociological analysis of the social inclusion issue, even if it was never disconnected from security theme. Instead of being an international level, now, the fear is related at the safety in the cities.

Table 3: Talk shows episodes from Cologne events up to the end of the surveys.

Date	Talk show	Title/Themes of episode
07/01/16	<i>Piazza Pulita</i>	“Crack – The hate”
11/01/16	<i>Quinta Colonna</i>	“What can we expect in 2016? Politics, taxes, immigration and social crisis under microscope”
12/01/16	<i>Ballarò</i>	Cologne, Turkey, Quarto, Italian politics, immigration, integration, taxes evasion, retirement benefits
14/01/16	<i>Piazza Pulita</i>	Italian politics, Quarto, public administration, civil unions, ISIS

Although they gave so much attention to the facts of Cologne, Italian talk shows have taken faithfully the subjects media agenda by examining the most relevant domestic issues from the first days of the year. Specifically, they discussed issues related to the political life of the State that have repercussions on citizens (public administration, retirement benefits), issues with social background (law on civil unions), but also subjects such as judicial scandal that involved the Municipality of Quarto⁹, small town near Naples (Table 3).

CONCLUSION

After the Paris attacks, talk shows have focused on immigration-security dichotomy, which is typical of today's multicultural society. Even before of it, international media have treated the immigration issue in terms of safety as well as hospitality and social inclusion. But in the selected period, the media narration talks about migration phenomenon performing a forced change of symbols and meanings, using clichés and moving the debate topics towards more sensitive issues to the public. Ordinary crime and citizen security are linked, almost “naturally”, to the increasing of migrants’ landings that are out of police control. The large presence of illegal immigrants is identified as one of the most important problem of the nation. If before the Paris events the security frame was crystallized within the issue of security in streets and houses, after it takes a new meaning: it talks about an international danger that threatens the entire West. The *Charlie Hebdo* shooting on 7 January 2015 is a fundamental element of the media narrative of which the Paris attacks are just a sign of continuity. It is the simulacrum of a Western unpreparedness proposed again after one year and that makes us even more vulnerable in the public eye. After the Cologne events, the fear grows even more because it has fallen into a cultural stereotype: the foreigner, in the role of the executioner, makes violence against women, who represents the victim but is, at the same time, guilty. Islamic terrorists attack women as the embodiment of Western cultural progress opposed to the Middle Eastern one. Although the media debate is centred on the security issue as well as linked to terrorism, now, it spills over into the area of social inclusion issue between two cultures both diverse and ancient, which can hardly coexist in a peaceful manner without any violence.

⁹ Giovanni De Robbio, city council member of Quarto, is accused of aggravated vote trading and attempted extortion against the Mayor Rosa Capuozzo. After that, they were expelled from their political party, the M5S.

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THE SYRIAN REFUGEE CRISIS IN EUROPE

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Abstract

The manuscript analyzes the current refugee's crisis in Europe and the situation of the Syrian refugees in Syria's neighboring countries such as Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey. The presented comparative analysis between the first instance decisions in asylum policies of several European countries is accompanied by additional statistics of the refugee's influx. Several suggestions related to the necessary measures to be taken in short and long term in order to ensure more sustainable migration patterns are discussed in detail.

Key words: Syrian refugees; European Migration policy; Borders; Integration

INTRODUCTION

The refugees and migration crisis is one of the major challenges for Europe and the World after the Second World War. According to a recent report of IOM (IOM 2015b), there were about 19.5 million refugees worldwide at the end of 2014. An essential part of them, about 14.4 million, were under the mandate of UNHCR that is around 2.9 million more compared to the previous year (UNHCR 2015b). The Dublin Regulation was adopted when the EU did not expect strong arrivals of asylum seekers. However, in 2011, the so-called "Arab Spring" marked the beginning of a significant number of irregular travels across the Mediterranean from Tunisia and Libya towards Italy and Malta, that later increased in magnitude when the political conflict in Syria started. The war in Syria caused over 4 million refugees. The average of about 300.000 refugees per year in the EU during the period 1994-2002, has been replaced by a arrival of asylum seekers, reaching 663.000 in 2014 and almost 1.005.500 at 21 of December of 2015 (IOM 2015a, b). 970.000 refugees arrived in Europe by crossing the Mediterranean. The major part of them has reached Greece and Italy, while Spain, Cyprus and Malta have been less affected (Migration Policy Center 2015). Another 30.000 arrived in Bulgaria from Turkey by land (Figure 1).



Figure 1: Annual numbers of migrants smuggled at sea and land during 2015
(<http://www.migrationpolicycentre.eu/migrant-crisis>, December 2015).

THE SYRIAN CONFLICT AND THE ROLE OF THE NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES

The conflict in Syria between the Government of Bashar al-Assad and other forces, which began in the spring of 2011, together with the appearance of the auto denominated Islamic State in the territories of Syria and Iraq, are the major causes of the massive migration within the countries, through the region and towards Europe. In late 2014, an estimated 7.6 million people were internally displaced and 3.7 million Syrians have left the country since the conflict began. During 2014, more than one million Syrians were registered as refugees in neighboring countries (Ayoub 2014, Oytun 2014). The Syrian conflict has put enormous pressure on neighboring Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey (Figure 2). In late 2014, Lebanon, with about 4.8 million of population hosted more than one million Syrian refugees. Similar is the situation in Turkey with more than one and a half million of registered refugees and in Jordan with more than five hundred thousands of registered refugees. More than 80% of registered Syrian refugees in the neighboring countries live in communities and cities instead of refugee camps. This arrival of refugees in the urban areas situated mainly in the northern part of Jordan and in Lebanon along the Syrian border has changed the demographics by creating problems of basic services such as water, sanitation, health care, housing, etc (UNDP 2014).

Since the beginning of the Syrian civil war, the number of refugees in Lebanon has increased by around 25% that led to a collapse of the national health, education, and infrastructure services mainly in the areas of higher concentration of refugees. At the end of 2014, more than the half of the registered Syrian refugees lived in bad conditions without the necessary basic supplies. Similar is the situation in Jordan. Among the Syrian refugees in that

country, nearly the half lived in poor sanitary conditions. According to IOM data, in 2015 (IOM 2015a, b), 9 of every 10 Syrian refugees living in Jordan and Lebanon are below the poverty threshold and only half of the children go to school (Lebanon 2014).

In Egypt, initially there was a protection program for the Syrian refugees, in terms of health and education, but the later introduction of visa requirements for Syrians in 2013, has reduced significantly the arrivals into the country (Ayoub 2014). Similar was the situation in the Kurdistan region of Iraq, where in the fall of 2013, the authorities stop the issuance of residence permits for Syrian refugees. The situation in Turkey is also dramatic. At the end of 2014, more than 70% of the Syrian refugees live outside refugee camps offered by the government, thus struggling for basic needs such as housing, health care and education (UNHCR 2014). It is believed now that the financial aid from EU to Turkey from March 2016, will improve the living conditions and the access of the refugees to the labor market (EU-Turkey 2016).




Figure 2: Registered Syrian refugees in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey – 2014
(Bitoulas 2015, EUROSTAT). My own depiction.

THE ASYLUM SEEKERS IN EUROPE: THE SYRIAN REFUGEES

Along this paper, the migrants will be considered as people entering irregularly in the EU and not migrants in general. In these terms, the number of asylum applications received in 2014 in the Member States of the European Union was 25% higher compared to the same period in 2013 (Figure 3).




Figure 3: Asylum applicants in EU-28 during January 2013 – December 2014
(Bitoulas 2015, EUROSTAT).

More than a half million refugees have arrived in Greece and more than 643.000 people have managed to cross the Mediterranean this year. Thousands are finding their way to Germany, Austria and Sweden, with about 10.000 arriving daily in Germany (Figure 4). During December the number of the people who have arrived in Germany was around 125.000 (IOM 2015b, Bitoulas - Eurostat 2015). This means that the total number of refugee's arrivals in the country at the end of 2015 is of 1.1 million. In comparison, at the end of 2014, their number was 200.000. Hundreds of thousands of people are still waiting in Turkey. There are about 40,000 people in the path of the Western Balkans on their way from Greece to Macedonia, Croatia and Slovenia. According to recent UNHCR data, about 64% of the immigrants are Syrian, 22% are Afghans, and 7% are Iraqi. The number of male refugees,

which in summer stood at 80%, has also changed, being in November 2015 of 64%, with 14% of women and 22% of children (Figure 5) (Bitoulas - Eurostat 2015).




Figure 4: Number of first asylum applications by countries for the period 2010-2015
(<http://www.migrationpolicycentre.eu/migrant-crisis/migrant-crisis-refugees>, December 2015).




Figure 5: Asylum applicants in % by gender, 2014 (Bitoulas 2015, EUROSTAT).

In comparison with other European countries, Germany and Sweden received the largest number of asylum applications by Syrian nationals. Between 2012 and 2014, Germany received 61.885 applications for asylum from Syrians and Sweden received 55.210 (German Federal Ministry of the Interior 2014, Government of Sweden 2014). In contrast to Germany and Sweden, the number of Syrians seeking asylum in the United Kingdom and the United States was modest, being respectively 5.739 and 5.280. There are several reasons for the difference in the number of asylum seekers, mainly due to family ties, location, and administrative procedures. Sweden and Germany are generally considered among Syrian asylum seekers safe countries, giving opportunities for jobs and settlement for a long-time term. The refugees receive in these two countries housing maintenance and support for integration into the labor market. These opportunities are more reduced in countries like, for example, Greece, which is suffering important consequences of the current economic crisis. In addition, one could mention the Court of Justice of the European Unions (ECJ 2013) ruling which establishes that “asylum seekers should not be returned to that country as they risk being treated inhumanely there”. According to Figure 6, the first instance decisions by outcome, corresponding to 2014, are mainly given by UK and Germany, followed by Belgium and Sweden (Bitoulas – Eurostat 2015).




Figure 6: First instance decisions by outcome, Selected Member States, 2014 (Bitoulas 2015, EUROSTAT).

During November and December 2015, the approach of Germany and Sweden has changed towards migration as they reintroduced border checks, thus keeping to international and EU law, assessing asylum on a case by case basis. This was due to the disagreement among governments and public opinion because of the inability to achieve a sustainable migration policy. In 2015, Germany received 36% of all asylum applications in the EU, which is a rather disproportional compared to the rest of the Member States of the Union, where the average is being of 16% (IOM 2015b).

TOWARDS A MORE SUSTAINABLE EUROPEAN MIGRATION POLICY

In general trends, there were several missed opportunities by the European policy makers in order to make the migration influx more sustainable and manageable. Strong disproportions were observed not only in the most affected states such as Greece, Italy and the countries of the Western Balkans, but also in Germany and Sweden and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, who have taken a very reserved decision on the migration crisis, thus enhancing the difference between Western and Eastern European countries in terms of European migration policy. Although during the last several months of 2015, Greece showed

that the country was not enough able to strength its borders (being external of the EU), Athens rejected the plan of the European Commission for the emergency to create a European border rapid reaction force that can intervene, even against the will of the state. The same applies to governments in Madrid, Budapest and Warsaw, arguing it as an act of violation of their national sovereignty. The decision of the EU to initially distribute 160.000 asylum seekers across the EU for a period of two years appears to be useless after the arrival of nearly one million refugees and the redistribution of a modest number of only 200 refugees until the end of 2015 (UNHCR 2015a). In March 2016, just 660 refugees agreed to share and have been relocated, thus showing that “the relocation scheme is inadequate and will continue to fail” (The Guardian 2016a). At the end of 2015, Slovakia, with the support of the Czech Republic, started a trial in the European Court against this agreement, showing that the EU faced the biggest problem since its foundation.

The Schengen area can only maintain its internal borders open if the external borders are well managed. However, “if a state believes that the neighbor is not doing enough to control its external borders and it is encouraging the immigrants to leave their territory to reach the other state, the closure of internal borders may apply” (Schengen Border Code Article 26). This has been happening in the “Balkan route”, where Hungary as well as Slovenia and Macedonia have put their own border fences in order to prevent the countries from the massive migration influx (UNHCR 2015b). However, the spirit of the Schengen Agreement is necessary for the normal functioning of tourism and trade and fences can only lead to major complications. Thus, new measures have to be taken. Among them are the following:

- Reduce the arrival of economic migrants in order to give better opportunities to the refugees fleeing from wars from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan. The proposal of the European Commission to create centers of processing of applications is a way to manage the incoming migration flow.
- Strengthen the system for return of economic migrants. A step towards it has been seen in the recent Malta summit between the EU and Africa, which has set up a special fund of EUR 1.800 million for the Horn of Africa and North African countries, being the countries of main migration passage of economic migrants to Europe.
- Reduce the flow of refugee arrivals in order to provide better reception conditions and better integrate them, thus avoiding the growth of xenophobic parties and events due to the increasing presence of refugees. In this direction, at the end of December 2015, FRONTEX deployed 293 employees and 15 boats on the Greek islands with the goal to help the country in limiting the refugees’ flow (FRONTEX 2015). According to the recent EU-Turkey agreement from March 2016, “all new irregular migrants crossing from Turkey into Greek islands as from 20 March 2016 will be returned to Turkey. For every Syrian being returned to Turkey from Greek islands, another Syrian will be resettled from Turkey to the EU taking into account the UN Vulnerability Criteria. The fulfillment of the visa liberalization roadmap will be accelerated vis-à-vis all participating Member States with a view to lifting the visa requirements for Turkish citizens at the latest by the end of June 2016, provided that all benchmarks have been met” (EU-Turkey 2016).
- Strengthen the control on the refugee’s registration. Only 10% of incoming refugees in Germany are controlled by border police. This number is too small in order to insure

state security as has been recently warned by the German Union of border police. Meanwhile the German police insist on viewing every single refugee claim for refugee status, particularly after the European Agency FRONTEX revealed that the majority of Syrian passports were false and especially after the Paris attacks of November 13th 2015, where at least one of the participants might have re-entered the EU through Greece, claiming to be an asylum seeker. Increase the mutual trust among the Member States, looking for a consensus on the migration policy. The Dublin regulation, requiring asylum seekers to apply for protection in the first European country in which they enter, must be adapted to the new conditions. Some proposals of the European commission are currently referring to redistribution around the EU bloc in times of crisis or to a “mandatory redistribution system for asylum seekers based on a country’s wealth and ability to absorb newcomers” (The Guardian 2016b).

- Create a European Border and Coast Guard Agency to transfer additional sovereign power from Member States to the European Union (European Border-Coast Guard 2015).
- Improve the living conditions of the Syrian refugees in first-asylum states such as Turkey and Jordan and Lebanon.

The concern of the European population regarding the immigration has risen since 2013 thus becoming between the main ones. Countries like Germany, Italy, Hungary, Sweden, The Netherlands or Bulgaria share major concerns with regard to the refugee influx (Migration Policy Center 2015). Thus, it is necessary to work in a long-term perspective, bearing in mind that it is very unlikely to reach soon a solution for the Syrian conflict and that the arrival of economic migrants and refugees will continue to rise. Recent surveys have shown that “50% of the young people between 15 and 24 years in West Africa and 35% in North Africa are ready to emigrate immediately if they could” (Migration Policy Center 2015). An important point to think is how to adapt the labor markets to the increase of magnitude of the incoming refugees. If the host countries become permanent for settlement, the employment of the immigrants will be an important problem in a long-term perspective.

One has to think as well about how to manage a full social and cultural integration of the refugees. Europe is facing a specific problem of integrating the Muslim population. The way to reach a quick integration of the refugees is very important. The ways to do it could be, for example, the realization of common projects and exchange of cultural traditions, the obligatory participation in language courses as well as courses on history and social values. There are numerous actions in Germany and other countries that provide suitable integration and opportunities to the arrived refugees (Flüchtlinge 2016).

Among the most important points however might be the voluntary character of engagements from the immigrants and the residents’ communities, and especially of those who are represented by the young people. This leads to a higher tolerance and acceptance of the new and the different being ethnicity, religion, age or education.

More steps towards this process are taken by the “German states that plan to spend about 17 billion Euros to deal with the refugee crisis in 2016. These are at least two billion Euros more than planned before by the government in Berlin”. Most money will be invested in the integration of newly arrived immigrants (Die Welt 2015). A strengthening of the German asylum regulations with tighter laws on asylum has been recently approved. They

introduce asylum procedures, “making it easier to deport migrants whose claim to asylum has not been recognized by the German state” (DW 2016). There is no doubt that the longer the Syrian war lasts, the more serious will be the consequences of it. Thus the International Community must intensively work to put an end as soon as possible to this severe political and humanitarian crisis in the Middle East and to give the opportunity to future generations to build again their home land and to live together by respecting differences in political, ethnical, religious, gender or age dimensions.

CONCLUSION

The current migration crisis requires the EU to rethink its asylum system and management with respect to the illegal migration and the sense of the Schengen Agreement. These actions become even more important after the terrorist attacks in France from November 2015 and in Belgium in March 2016 and the attempts of other attacks in different EU countries. For this aim a quick restoring of the trust among the Member States in order to take a common consensus in terms of migration policy is highly desirable. Giving priority to immigrants coming from war zones such as Syria, Iraq or Afghanistan before the economic immigrants, coming from many other poor countries is one of the necessary steps to be taken in order to introduce some criteria of differentiation. The Dublin regulation must be adapted to the new conditions, thus requiring the Member States to register who arrives on their territory, accompanied as well by the requirement of the migrants / asylum seekers to register. Additional mechanisms are absolutely necessary to ensure a stable and sustainable distribution of refugees among the states, thus avoiding excessive and unmanageable accumulation of refugees at some of the external borders of the EU.

It is also very important to reduce the strain on Syria neighboring countries by sharing responsibility with the international community, as well as to increase the refugee resettlement and increase of the role of private sponsorship and labor mobility schemes.

Finally, in the long term, the EU should envision mechanisms for the integration of refugees, especially in the labor market and look for perspective on how to adapt it to the refugees' influx by taking in mind the demographic crisis in Europe.

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IRREGULAR MIGRATION FLOWS AND HUMAN TRAFFICKING IN THE WESTERN BALKAN COUNTRIES: CHALLENGES OF THE CONVERGENCE OF COUNTER- TRAFFICKING RESPONSE

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Abstract

Irregular migration on the Western Balkan route has marked an unprecedented number during the last five years. Evidence indicates that both, non-European nationals and Western Balkan citizens have been involved in this complex migratory flow being exposed to various risks of human trafficking. But Western Balkan countries are source, transit and destination countries of human trafficking while their states are not well organized to implement a comprehensive and well-coordinated regional response to combat it. This paper aims at examining challenges faced by the Western Balkan countries to converge anti-trafficking response while facing increased irregular migratory waves. Using secondary data it illustrates various disparities and differences among them concluding that a well-coordinated, multi-faceted and integrated regional response is needed to combat this humanitarian problem.

Key words: irregular migration; Western Balkan route; human trafficking; weak state; counter-trafficking response

INTRODUCTION

Migration is significantly increased in XXI century becoming more complex and including diverse categories of migrants. According to estimations, there are more than 247 million international migrants (Thompson 2015). Since 2011, the strategic geographical location of the Western Balkan countries became increasingly attractive serving as an important pull factor of irregular movement of citizens from Syria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia to the European Union (Cvejić and Babović 2014; Zitnanova 2014). This trend peaked in 2015 (FRONTEX 2015; IOM 2015) where a total of 34,775 cases were detected by the European Union Member States bordering the Western Balkans during the second quarter of 2015. This figure represents a 24 percent increase with the level of irregular migration recorded during the same period of 2014 (FRONTEX 2015).

Illegal border crossing on the Western Balkan route has been complex and mixed with irregular migration of the nationals of the Western Balkan countries (FRONTEX 2015; IOM 2015). Triggered by economic underdevelopment of their area, high unemployment rate,

political instability and visa liberalization system applied to them for a short stay to the European Union Member States, irregular migratory trends of the Western Balkan nationals escalated (Zitnanova 2014). But irregular migration flows observed raised a number of challenges to the Western Balkan countries taking into consideration their complex processes of independent state formation during post-Yugoslavia period and difficult path from isolated socialist system to open market economy (Cvejić and Babović 2014).

It is argued that illegal migration is closely linked with human trafficking and this grave human rights abuse will continue to grow as long as illegal migration pressure remains high (Mahmoud and Trebesch 2010; Thompson 2015). Currently, the Western Balkan countries are the source, transit and destination countries for human trafficking (USA Department of State 2015). Even though human being trafficking is defined as a criminal act in their respective criminal codes (EU 2015), they fail to comprehensively and sustainably combat it due to various factors mainly related to weak state, corruption and lack of a regional approach.

This paper aims at examining challenges faced by the Western Balkan countries to converge their anti-trafficking response while facing increased irregular migratory waves. It uses secondary data to describe the scale and nature of irregular migrations flows on the Western Balkan route during the last years analyzing a range of shortcomings they face to comprehensively combat human trafficking. It is organized in five parts. Following introduction presented in the first part, a brief overview of the socio-economic and political context of the Western Balkan region is provided in the second part including its internal dynamics and ongoing developmental disparities. The third part outlines the nature and scale of irregular migration on the Western Balkan route highlighting its characteristics and vulnerabilities where irregular migrants are highly exposed. An analysis of challenges faced to converge counter-trafficking response in this region with a special emphasis on weak state, corruption and lack of effective regional cooperation is presented in the fourth part. Finally, conclusions are drawn on the fifth part.

BRIEF SOCIO - ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONTEXT OF THE WESTERN BALKAN COUNTRIES

In this paper, the Western Balkan countries consist of six states respectively, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia. They cover a total area of 207,831 square kilometer and are populated by 18,687,196 inhabitants (CIA 2015). In general, this region is very diverse representing a mosaic of cultures, religions and ethnicities which have gradually shaped its characteristics over years (Zitnanova 2014). Since the beginning of 1990s, its development has been impacted by three events and processes: a) the collapse of socialist system and centralized economy; b) the disintegration of Yugoslavia and various conflicts during the process of new independent states formation; c) the process of the European Union enlargement (Boano et al 2003).

Transition of these countries to capitalism has been very slow because of their imbalances and inequalities in development (Jeleva 2012; Zitnanova 2014). Underdevelopment of small, sensitive, highly interconnected and interdependent economies depends on aid, loans and remittances making them unable to withstand competitive pressures of the European Union market (CEES and EFB 2014). Uncompleted structural transformation

processes that started almost two decades ago have been featured by high levels of state intervention and low levels of institutional complementarity with the European Union markets (CEES and EFB 2014; IMF 2015). Underdevelopment of private sector deepened during global economic crisis where economies of these countries were exposed to other external shocks respectively, reduced capital inflow from abroad and reduction of export demand (CEES and EFB 2014). Higher long-term unemployment rate especially among women and young people increased indicating failure of the economic growth to reduce it and ‘trickle down’ to the neediest groups (Black et al 2007). Mass waves of labor migration were triggered in the region (Zitnanova 2014), while informal economy flourished becoming a severe threat for fragile economies of the region. Exports consist on low-value added products while economic growth is mainly driven by external demand for them (Jeleva 2012). Key socio-economic indicators of the Western Balkan countries are presented in Table 1.

Table 1: Key socio-economic indicators of the Western Balkan countries (CIA, 2015)

Countries	Total population (in 2014)	GDP (PPP) in 2014 (in billion USD)	GDP per capita (PPP) (2014) in USD	Unemployment rate (in 2014)	GINI index	Population below poverty line
Albania	3,029,278	31.59	11,400	18 %	26.9	14.3 %
Bosnia and Herzegovina	3,867,055	38.29	9,900	43.9 %	36.2	17.2 %
Macedonia	2,096,015	27.72	13,400	28 %	43.6	30.4 %
Kosovo	1,870,981	16.92	NA	30.9 %	30	30 %
Montenegro	647,073	9.428	15,100	18.5 %	26.2	8.6 %
Serbia	7,176,794	95.84	13,400	19.7 %	38.7	9.2 %

Political instability and social tensions accompanied post-war recovery of the region. Newly established independent states faced multiple challenges caused by complete breakdown of the old political, social and administrative structures (Zitnanova 2014). The process of reconciliation that started after violent conflicts of the 1990s is far from complete (CEES and EFB 2014; Jeleva 2012). Internal political polarization is consolidated in the hands of uncompromising political elites and ethno-nationalist parties (CEES and EFB 2014; van Ham 2014). Weak state structures and lack of the rule of law caused region’s re-feudalization (Riley 2013). Its path to the European Union membership is challenged by multiple and chronic ills (CEES and EFB 2014).

OVERVIEW OF THE SCALE AND NATURE OF IRREGULAR MIGRATION ON THE WESTERN BALKAN ROUTE

The migratory profile of the Western Balkan countries is very diverse because their migration dynamics significantly changed over the past few years transforming this region in an important migration hub (Cvejić and Babović 2014). Initially region’s migration was characterized by outflows of the Western Balkan nationals while nowadays extensive migratory movements indicate that it serves as both, transitory and destination region (Zitnanova 2014). Irregular migration significantly increased during the period 2010-2014 (FRONTEX 2015). Irregular migration is defined as migration that does not follow rules and procedures established to regulate the international movement of people in origin, transit and

destination countries (IOM 2011). Its main characteristics are illegal border crossing and illegal stay in the country (Cvejić and Babović 2014). Reports indicate that the Western Balkan route has been extensively used by migrants from Africa and conflicting zones of Asia who transit through Greece, Macedonia and Albania, and continue through this route to reach the European Union (FRONTEX 2015; Lembovska 2013; USA Department of State 2015). The majority of them are single males aged 18-35 years (Zitnanova 2014). Data indicate that during the second quarter of 2015, illegal border crossing of Afghans and Syrians on the Western Balkan route represented 40 percent and 30 percent of the detected irregular migrants. Compared to the same period of 2014, the total number of illegal Syrian migrants increased 20 fold, followed by illegal Afghan migrants 17 times higher and illegal migrants from South African countries by 6 fold (FRONTEX 2015). Figure 1 shows the trend of this movement in this region.




Figure 1: Illegal border crossing on the Western Balkan route: 2009-2014 (FRONTEX, 2015)

But irregular migration exposes migrants to a range of vulnerabilities mainly related to abuse, exploitation and discrimination. They are in danger of being involved in human trafficking which is a serious violation of human rights (IOM 2015; UN 2013). Evidence indicates that irregular migrants on the Western Balkan route are facing high risks from traffickers and criminal networks (MHUB 2015). They become subject to severe violence and coercion, while their life in shadow in destination countries makes them prone to abuse by traffickers (Mahmoud and Trebesch 2010). Exploitation of victims of human trafficking shows not only the vulnerability of those who choose or are forced to irregular migration but also the risks that they are willing to undertake in order to leave their country and go to another (Thompson 2015). It has to be mentioned that in crisis-effected situations, irregular migrants are usually ignored and rarely prioritized. Currently, the Western Balkan region has

low capacities to support them because it suffers from weak social service support system, while traditional support structures have been broken down increasing migrants' vulnerabilities and making them an easy target for traffickers (Thompson 2015).

CHALLENGES OF THE CONVERGENCE OF TRAFFICKING RESPONSE IN THE WESTERN BALKAN REGION

Human trafficking is a humanitarian problem which is becoming the most horrifying business (Mahmoud and Trebesch 2010). Research indicates that there is a close link between illegal migration and human trafficking (Lembovska 2013; Mahmoud and Trebesch 2010). Human trafficking is viewed as an inevitable side effect of migration in the age of globalization. Its incidence increases as migration escalates (Lembovska 2013; Mahmoud and Trebesch 2010). Determinants of human trafficking can be found in both, demand and supply side. On the *demand side*, large-scale of migration may increase the opportunities of the traffickers to easily recruit potential victims making this market very attractive. Taking advantage of the local shadow migrant industry, areas of mass migration provide a continuous supply of potential victims (Mahmoud and Trebesch 2010). On the *supply side*, population of economically poor, deprived and conflicting areas might see migration as the sole strategy to start better life and increase economic opportunities. This has implications for their migration process because they might be prone to illegal border crossing or give their consent to exploitative working conditions (Mahmoud and Trebesch 2010).

Human trafficking in the Western Balkan countries

Article 3 of the paragraph (a) of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons defines human trafficking as “the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs” (UN 2000, 2).

Despite difficulties faced to collect exact data about human trafficking in the Western Balkan countries (Pangerc 2013; UN 2013), consecutive Trafficking in Persons reports show that they are source, transit and destination countries of human trafficking (USA Department of State 2015). The scale of this phenomenon is higher than that reported by their concerned government authorities (Zitnanova 2014). Inadequate mechanisms of victims' identification have limited them to sexual exploitation only increasing their bias (EU 2015). Table 2 shows the total number of victims of human trafficking identified in the Western Balkan countries during the period 2009-2013.

Table 2: Victims of human trafficking identified in the Western Balkan countries during the period 2009-2013 (EU, 2015)

Countries	Years				
	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Albania	94	97	84	92	NA
Bosnia and Herzegovina	69	25	35	39	NA
Macedonia	5	5	8	4	1
Kosovo	29	39	39	54	52
Montenegro	3	-	1	2	1
Serbia	85	76	74	63	45

The phenomenon of human trafficking in the Western Balkan countries falls under two categories respectively, sexual trafficking of women and irregular migration headed for the European Union countries (Ağir 2014). Except Macedonia, the governments of other Western Balkan countries do not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of human trafficking despite efforts made. For almost one decade, they have been ranked in Tier 2 (USA Department of State 2015). Table 3 shows Tier ranking of the Western Balkan countries during the period 2007-2015.

Table 3: Tier ranking of the Western Balkan countries, 2007-2015 (USA Department of State 2014, 2015)

Countries	Year								
	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Albania	2	Watch list 2	2	2	2	2	Watch list 2	2	2
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	Watch list 2	2
Macedonia	2	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1
Kosovo	NA	NA	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Montenegro	2	Watch list 2	Watch list 2	2	2	2	2	2	2
Serbia	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2

At international level, the Western Balkan countries (except Kosovo) have ratified the 2000 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the 2005 Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings (Zitnanova 2014). At national level, human trafficking is defined as a criminal act in the criminal codes of the respective countries under study (EU 2015). Moreover, comprehensive anti-trafficking legal frameworks have been adopted along with action plans to combat human trafficking. Institutional structures and referring mechanisms have been established to enhance prevention, protect victims and prosecute traffickers (Zitnanova 2014). However, the picture of the victims of human trafficking in the region is limited due to lack of cooperation between the country of origin and the country of destination (EU 2015).

But increased irregular migratory movements on the Western Balkan route found countries of this region unprepared to address needs of big groups of migrants who arrive in their territories especially from irregular migration. Even though the elements of irregular

migration are explicitly defined by these countries in a similar way, strategic documents developed by them lack information about specific measures, while strategies implemented are neither monitored nor evaluated (Cvejić and Babović 2014). In general, there are no legal arrangements in place to support and protect migrants as well as deliver victim-centered and human rights-based services to them. Therefore, they are exposed to various difficulties to access adequate treatment and attention in respective countries (Zitnanova 2014). Lack of opportunities for a decent life in this region is limited to irregular migrants who might be willing to stay (Cvejić and Babović 2014).

Weak state

A weak state is defined as the state that is unable to enforce rules or unwilling to implement consistent policies (Ağir 2014). Key structural problems that characterize the phenomenon of the weak state are inadequate institutional performance and legitimacy deficits (Ağir 2014). Irregular migration and human trafficking can be successfully combated in the Western Balkan countries if they work together to ensure an effective regional police cooperation. But they are currently challenged by a) human and administrative under capacity; b) superficial cooperation; c) lack of police cooperation projects between non-EU and EU member states (Lembovska 2013). Even though the region shows a tangible achievement on its path towards European Union accession, the Fragile State Index indicates that weak states of the region pose a challenge not only for their countries but also for their neighbors (FFP 2015). Table 4 shows ranking of the Western Balkan states based on their levels of stability and pressure among 178 worldwide nations in 2015.

Table 4: Fragile State Index of the Western Balkan countries, 2015 (FFP, 2015)

	Score	Ranking (among 178 nations)	Ranking interpretation
Albania	61.9	125	low warning
Bosnia and Herzegovina	77.4	79	warning
Macedonia	64.5	118	low warning
Kosovo	NA	NA	NA
Montenegro	54.2	132	stable
Serbia	73.8	92	warning

The presence of the weak states in the Western Balkan region has created favorable environment for blooming of irregular migration, human trafficking, corruption and region's insecurity (Ağir 2014). Institutional structures and mechanisms established at national level to implement legal and policy frameworks are not always translated into practice. Shortcomings are observed in practical coordination and insufficient application of standard operating procedures for identification of victims and their protection (Zitnanova 2014).

Corruption

Corruption is a serious threat for the Western Balkan countries that inspire EU integration. It undermines state legitimacy and hampers region's prosperity (van Ham 2014). Corruption is deeply rooted in political elites and state institutions of the region (Ađir 2014) contributing to challenging institutional setting making unable to implement effective anti-corruption policies (UNODC 2011). Being systematic and well-organized, it is an area of vulnerability of the region that negatively impacts adoption of anti-corruption measures in line with the EU standards and establishment of a healthy market economy guided by consolidated institutions (Ađir 2014).

Commitment of the governments of the Western Balkan countries to adopt comprehensive anti-corruption international legal instruments into their national policies did not always yield positive results. They ratified the 2004 United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) in order to implement review mechanisms through a peer review process by encouraging a nationally driven participatory approach towards anti-corruption reform. In addition, they also ratified the 1999 Council of Europe Civil Law and Criminal Law Conventions on Corruption which led to the establishment of anti-corruption programs and action plans throughout the region (UNODC 2011).

But, the Western Balkan nationals rank corruption as the third biggest problem (UNODC 2011), while the 2015 Corruption Perceptions Index calculated for 168 countries worldwide shows that this phenomenon has increasingly hijacked state institutions of this region marking an worrying trend (Transparency International 2015). It is high in Kosovo, Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Table 5 shows Corruption Perceptions Index in the Western Balkan countries in 2015.

Table 5: Corruption Perceptions Index in the Western Balkan countries, 2015 (Transparency International 2015)

	Score	Ranking (among 168 nations)
Albania	36	88
Bosnia and Herzegovina	38	76
Macedonia	42	66
Kosovo	33	103
Montenegro	44	61
Serbia	40	71

Furthermore, corruption of the police officers has been very problematic for law enforcement to combat human trafficking. For instance, in Albania, official complicity in trafficking issues remains high. Police corruption in Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina has created an environment that has facilitated trafficking crimes, while in Serbia bribery has influenced on trafficking cases (USA Department of State 2015).

Regional cooperation

Complex nature of irregular migration combined with high levels of human trafficking call for a well harmonized and synchronized regional approach to be addressed. Adoption of Southeast Europe 2020 Strategy for regional management of migration is a good start to enrich institutional support of these countries (Cvejić and Babović 2014). Support provided by IOM and UNHCR to develop a comprehensive regional approach on Refugee Protection and International Migration in the Western Balkans seeks to strengthen the capacities of these states to address migratory movements from outside the region by fostering national and regional dialogue as well as practical cooperation on issues of common concern (Zitnanova 2014).

However, national response and regional cooperation are not fully enhanced leading to lack of coordination and effective horizontal implementation of mechanisms (IOM 2015). Shortcomings in proper implementation of the current legislation combined with gaps in institutional structures and underdeveloped capacities of services have hampered creation of a protective environment challenging effectiveness of anti-trafficking initiatives undertaken (Zitnanova 2014). Complex nature of irregular migration might exacerbate disparities in capacities of the Western Balkan states to respond to it. Lack of harmonized and coordinated regional responses might shift irregular migratory pressures to other neighboring countries (Zitnanova 2014). Therefore, strengthening of the sustainable cooperation among regional partners is crucial to combat human trafficking and reduce the vulnerabilities of migrants (Thompson 2015).

CONCLUSION

Located at the cross road between Europe and Asia, the Western Balkan region is transformed in an area of significant increase of mass irregular migration to reach the European Union. Complexity of this area which tries with unresolved issues of the past, inequalities and imbalances in economic development, weak social service support system, incomplete process of state building and consolidation has increased vulnerabilities of irregular migrants exposing them to high risks of human trafficking. Various nationally-oriented and locally driven anti-trafficking efforts have been tailored but they did not produce positive results because they were not well-coordinated and harmonized with other counter-trafficking initiatives at regional level. This regional problem requires a regional approach to be tackled. There is no “one size fits all” approach. Therefore, new regional initiatives supported by international community should be strengthened and adopted to national policies and action plans. Besides this, a multi-faceted, integrated, sustainable and synchronized regional anti-trafficking response is highly required to protect victims of trafficking and monitor the quality of standards and procedures implemented to these rights holders.

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THE INFLUENCE OF ISLAMIC STATE ON THE GLOBAL SECURITY

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Abstract

The region of Middle East has been for centuries space of interweaving of interests of power holders, both within the countries of the region and major world powers. The favorable geographical position and significant reserves of natural resources, principally oil, make the Middle East, in terms of security, very sensitive. Clash of civilizations and religions in the region and the locations of the most important holy places for both Christianity and Islam were historically a stumbling rock and a great obstacle to peace and prosperity. The aim of this article is to point out and to attempt to answer the question how Islamic State can influence on a global security. Considering the complexity of the security reality in the Middle East, it can be said that the importance is reflected in the fact that it provides a contribution to its knowing the aspect that arises from the problem issues.

Key words: Middle East, Islamic state, civilization, religion, natural resources

INTRODUCTION

The contemporary world, at the beginning of the 21st century, faces a wide range of challenges, risks and threats to the security of which perhaps the most significant one is terrorism. Terrorism, with the implementation of measures designed to provoke fear and psychological shock of the target population, became a very effective method of achieving broader political goals. Terrorist groups seek to popularize their ranks and global impact which affects the new setting of the security scene of the country, region and the world. The Middle East has been for centuries space of interweaving of interests of power holders, both within the countries of the region, and the interests of regional and major world powers. The

favorable geographical position and significant reserves of natural resources, principally oil, make the Middle East, in terms of security, very sensitive.

The clash of civilizations and religions in the region and the location of the most important holy places of Christianity and Islam were during history a stumbling rock and a great obstacle to peace and prosperity.

The process of change that has swept as domino effect the countries in the Arab world in North Africa, known as the “Arab Spring” has trickled the region of the Middle East, which is even more stratified with already difficult security situation. In contrast to the “Arab Spring” in Africa where after a changes of autocratic regimes gradual stabilization of the security situation has experienced, in the Middle East there has been an escalation of the conflict in which an important role play forces gathered around the Islamic state.

Bearing in mind the breadth and importance of the subject matter, the objective of this article is to investigate and attempts to answer the problem question, “what are the causes contributed to genesis and development of the Islamic state?” Considering the complexity of the security reality in the Middle East it can be said that the importance of this article reflects in the fact that it provides a contribution to getting knowledge the aspect that arises from the problem issues.

Another aspect of the importance of the this work refers to the fact that also Republic of Serbia faces challenges, risks and threats that are a result of conflict in the Middle East (Marković 2015). Finally, we can say that the work is important because it points to the groundlessness of identifying the ideology of Islamists of narrow views of individuals or groups of people, with the official Islam as one of the three major world religions.

The article is structured, conditionally, into three logically related units which will help the reader to bring the problem to be better understood. The first part set out general information about an Islamic state. The content of the second part refers to the possible answers to the problem issues. It highlights the causes of the emergence and development of the Islamic State with reference to current strategic circumstances in multilevel analysis. In addition, there is also discussed the available knowledge regarding the methods and aims of the organization's operations, financing sources and the reactions of interested countries in the region and leading countries of the international community. The article conclusion set out a vision of the authors in relation to the creation and development of the Islamic state.

THE GENESIS AND DEVELOPMENT OF ISLAMIC STATE

The term Islamic State (hereinafter IS) has a double meaning, and it is necessary to determine the precise relative to the theme and contents covered in the paper. First, this concept implies the shape of state regulation based on religious grounds and Islam. Consequently, the particular states in their names have an Islamic frame such as the Islamic Republic of Iran. Secondly, the concept of the Islamic State refers to it as the terrorist organization which, in terms of themes covered in this work.

The Islamic State is a terrorist organization of Sunni extremists acting in the territory of Iraq and Syria. It is also known under the names of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, (ISIL)¹, the Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria (ISIS) and the Islamic State of Iraq and

¹) Levant means East or East countries. Levant is common name for the countries which are located on east coast of Mediterranean Sea - Greece, Turkey, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Israel, Egypt.

Sham (Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham). As a basic method of operation, IS advocate and applies jihad which is their way to identify their actions and objectives with the goals of Islam. At the same time, this way the Islamic State is trying to point out need of all Islamic world need for an all-out struggle against the infidels. The methods or the program of action of this organization cannot be whatsoever identified with any part, learning or belief of official Islam. Thus expresses the utmost respect for all Muslims across the globe that practices their religion and propagates to achieve universal peace, what is original learning of Islam. Identifying extremist ideologies or extremist groups and organizations with official Islam carries risk and deepening the divide between Muslims and members of other religions around the world, especially Christians. Moreover, it may provoke a counter as identification of terrorists and Muslims and it can influence that Muslims who do not support the extreme views start to act in this direction.

The Islamic State was initially created as a branch of Al Qaeda during the occupation of Iraq by the coalition led by the United States (hereinafter-USA), and it's fully expansion was seen in the conflict in Syria. The fact that IS controls significant territory of Syria and Iraq indicates the seriousness and potential for achieving the proclaimed goals of which the most important is the creation of a one single Islamic State and declaring the "Caliphate". Brutality and cruelty in actions and public executions of Western journalists and prisoners have influenced the popularity and increase the power of this organization and also becoming growing concern in the international community. The significance of IS has a transnational character. Ideology propagated by hostility towards the US and the Western powers and all the "infidels" is very cleverly used to attract and recruit supporters, both from the Middle East region and from around the world. In addition, the target of IS is not limited to the formation of a separate state entity only of the territory of Syria and Iraq, but also in areas that are predominantly inhabited with Muslim population. In practice, this means that the projected territory IS includes large parts of Europe, Asia and Africa. Much of European countries, directly or indirectly, are already facing a number of problems which have the root in the conflicts in the Middle East. First of all, there is the potential threat of terrorism, compounded with problem of the arrival of a large number of migrants in Europe, changes in the demographic structure of various countries and cultural differences, as well as the possible distortion of the security situation after returning volunteers from the ranks of IS in their home country. It can be concluded that certain consequences of Islamic State already affecting the creation of the security reality in the European states. To act on time and response to potential security risks and threats, it is necessary to engage overall capacity of the state to monitor the security situation in the Middle East and the possible security implications of the territory of Republic of Serbia. Bearing in mind the historical contradictions of these areas, the nature of the conflict in the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the current security situation in Republic of Serbia tainted status of Kosovo and Metohija and the presence of extremist Islamic organizations make Republic of Serbian security sensitive and suitable for the activities of the members of the Islamic state.

Originally, the name of Islamic State was Al Qaeda in Iran, and two years later it changed the name to the Islamic State of Iraq. At the head of this organization, from its formation till his death in 2006, was Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Abu Omar al-Baghdadi succeeded him but was killed in 2010. Period of formation until 2010 was marked by the fights of Sunni extremists against the occupying forces in Iraq, as well as organizational and

numerical strengthening. After the death of the leader of the Islamic State in Iraq, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi in 2010 and short crisis group was plunged into, at the head of the Islamic State in Iraq comes Abu Bakar al-Baghdadi (Kan 2014). By the start of the conflict in Syria, under a new leader, the terroristic organization has carried out more terrorist attacks on Iraqi territory directed against the ruling regime, the occupying forces and opponents. In this period there was a gradual divergence between the two leading Sunni Islamist terrorist organizations in the region. Abu Bakar al-Baghdadi, 2013, declared the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, which was not favorably accepted by the leaders of Al Qaeda and Syrian terrorist organization “Džabat al-Nusra” (Kan 2014). The core of disagreement was the decision and commitment of Al-Baghdadi to put under one command all Sunni Islamist forces in Iraq and Syria. Different views on the ways and methods of action against the United States and enemies in the region influenced the separation of the Islamic State in Iraq from its root, Al-Qaeda. These developments pointed to the lack of unity of Sunni Islamists in the region.

Operation of the Islamic State since 2013

After the complexity of the security situation and the beginning of the armed conflict, the seat of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant was transferred from the territory of Iraq to the city of Raqqa in Syria, after which the members of this organization were actively involved in the fights against the regular Syrian forces. Given the substantial strength, strong discipline and good leadership under Al Baghdadi, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant in the short period of time conquer significant territory in the east and north of Syria and part of Iraq where they declared Caliphate. By the proclamation of the Caliphate, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant formed its authorities trying to establish itself as soon as possible as the state. The successes on the field and cruelty method of operation influenced that the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant soon become crucial actor in the conflict in this region. In 2014, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant changed its name to the Islamic state. Changing the name of the organization which ejected from the name geographical destination, may indicate a further, long-term aspirations of IS in terms of the spread of ideology and influence outside the Middle East region. The growing power of Islamic State and their actions become a threat not only to countries in the region, but also to their historical, civilization and cultural heritage (Softić 2015). Unscrupulousness of action goes to physically destroy all traces that indicate the historical existence and development of anything that does not belong to “original” Islamic civilization. The best example of this are destroyed ancient monuments in the city of Palmyra in Syria (Beta 2014).

Considering the general security situation in the region and the conflict in Syria, inevitably the question arises, what impact influenced on the formation and development of the Islamic state. In response to this question maybe lies the answer how to fight it. To be able to understand the origin and development of IS, it is necessary to perceive problems in multiple levels of analysis. However, the main guiding principle in finding the answers to this problematic question is finding the answers to the question that has an interest such an organization arises, exists and acts in a manner which, according to many, is unprecedented in human history.

The genesis of Islamic State

The first level in an attempt to define the causes of the genesis and development of IS is a reference to the historical, religious and cultural factors. The Middle East is a region that historically has been the target of numerous invasions. Certainly the most significant ones were crusades wars whose actual objectives differ significantly from the original goals of struggle for liberation of Holy land. The essence of these campaigns was the conquest of new territories, the expansion of the European countries to the east and the spread of Christianity in the East. These historical events have influenced the deepening animosity between Christians and Muslims, who, to a lesser or greater extent, are still present today. During the expansion of colonial rule, region of the Middle East was under the protectorate of France and England which inevitably caused great dissatisfaction of the local population, who were, in the vast majority, the Islamic religion. Exploitative relationship and stifling any attempt of building and creating national identity of the people of the Middle East could have a significant impact on creating a sense of resentment and dissatisfaction of the local Muslim population for the colonial authorities. Rejection of the cultural characteristics and peculiarities, as well as efforts to establish a new pro-Western cultural model by the colonial powers and the Christian world were further affected negatively on the local population. That situation became good ground for development of extremist movements and groups in the local population whose action goal was liberation from the colonial rule. Whereas the colonial powers used the religion in order to win the loyalty of local residents. The conflicts in the region in recent history (the Arab-Israeli wars, the war between Iraq and Iran, the First and Second Gulf War) had a significant impact on the cultural peculiarities and social development of the population, especially the younger generation. Some of those people were born and raised during the conflicts, fighting for mere survival and often with a sense of oppression, distress and hopelessness. Growing up in this kind of social climate and environmental realities can be twofold impact on young people. First, when the way to better future cannot be seen, answers can be found in religion and God, and secondly, when these people form a specific complex of values. This values characterized by fighting spirit, strict respect for national peculiarities and faith, a sense of national pride and desire for revenge, aversion and ruthlessness of the enemy, the ability to survive, but also for giving own life for the overall objective. A significant part of the former children and young people are now in the ranks of the Islamic State because it offers hope, a sense of security and confidence to stand up for the right thing. The division of Muslims on the Shiites and Sunnis, as well as the presence of a large number of ethnic and religious groups in the Middle East, historically conditioned developments in two directions. The first is striving to achieve dominance and complete domination over Shiites in the region so that Sunni Islam becomes the only, and therefore one ruler - caliph. The second direction is the effort that the region "cleansed" of unbelievers. In this sense, one of the causes of the IS can be a political struggle for wealth and power. (Perce 2015) Of course, this cause can be cleverly hidden in the ideology. A possible argument for this approach can be a separation of Al Qaeda and the IS even though the declared goals in the long run, are very similar. The answer lies in the fact that the ruler can be only one. Another aspect of comprehending the causes of the emergence and development of Islamic State are the interests of the regional powers in the Middle East - Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey and Israel. The nature of interests of regional powers in this area is very complex

and also very important for this work. They are interwoven and mutually dependent on a significant extent that has historically conditioned their changes which, almost as a rule, affect the setting of the game and the rules of safety in the region. In considering the possible impact of regional powers in the formation of IS it is necessary to consider the interests of each of the countries and the relationship with other countries in the region. The Islamic Republic of Iran is a country with growing influence in the region and aspires to become a leading regional power. The state that was the sworn enemy of the United States in the Middle East, nowadays Iran stands with USA together in a fight against IS. Because of the open hostility to IS as a terrorist organization, Iran and United States were practically placed on the same side which was unthinkable. According to Mr. Osman Softic, one of the major reasons of origin IS are conflict of interests between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Pro-Iranian regime in Baghdad and the official Tehran believe that by financing the extremist Sunni organizations in Iraq and Syria, Saudi Arabia directly influenced the occurrence of IS, and later its expansion. The explanation for this stance, the author sees in Saudi Arabia fear of the growing influence of Iran. Merits of this fear are that Iran can exert influence on the Shiite population that inhabited the east of Saudi Arabia, which are contrary to its interests. (The most important resources of oil are located in the east part of Saudi Arabia) Iran's influence as a regional power are becoming increasingly important and they go in the favor of the fact that the United States are gradually redefining geostrategic interests in the Middle East and focus more to the geospatial Pacific region. In this context, the IS and its action are in the interest of Saudi Arabia, and the goal is to weaken the influence of Iran in the region. Military intervention in Iraq by the United States could not bring the desired results, which were reflected in the overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime and establish a democratic government that will introduce the overall reform of Iraqi society into an era of prosperity. The essence of the failure was series of false assumptions, and one of them, and perhaps crucial neglecting the cultural and social peculiarities and differences between the two civilizations. After the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and his execution, the US faced a series of problems that simply could not be solved through military force. Faced with a kind of stalemate, the US withdrew its troops from Iraq, but the question is what they left behind. They left the new Shiite-led government, unprepared and poorly organized Iraqi military and fairly wide scope for influence Iranian interest because for Iran certainly fit Shiite elite to headed Iraq. The Iraqi government was led by Prime Minister Maliki, who was settled on the function with approve of USA and Iran after withdraw of American soldiers from Iraq. Instead of learning a lesson from the recent history, and embarked the path of national reconciliation, Prime Minister made a mistakes by supporting riots which caused Iraq enormous damage.

They start firing from the state institutions Sunni officers, as well as prominent people of the Sunni cultural and religious elite. Naturally, this action provoked negative reactions. The reactions were reflected in the increasing dissatisfaction and a sense of hostility of the Sunni population to the country and to Shiite population. Such security situation was fertile ground for awakening and organization of Sunni extremists because it is natural to respond to oppression with force. Given the above, one of the causes of action and IS can be found in the unwillingness of the newly formed Iraqi government to overcome the ghosts of the past and to led society to prosperity built of equality for all regardless of their religion or background. Due to reinforcement of military unit, IS leadership accepted large number of

officers of the former Iraqi army (during the reign of Saddam Hussein). This brought even greater support from the Sunni tribes and fighters (Radosavljevic 2014).

The moment that refers to the influence of Iranian interests in the area of Iraq after the withdrawal of the United States has another connotation significant from the point of origin of the Islamic State (Softić 2014). Although the United States and Iran have, on the first look, the same interest to support Maliki government, the United States do not find welcome the Iranian aspiration to become a leading regional power. This opinion of the US is supported by its allies in the region, Israel and Saudi Arabia. The emergence of IS, therefore, could be the common interest of Israel and Saudi Arabia because it directly affects the weakening of Iran, which is hostile to Israel, and which Saudi Arabia see as competitive force. On the complexity of the interests of the regional powers in the Middle East affects also Israel, the only non-Arab country of the Levant. Significant forces that sided with the regular forces in Syria are pro-Iranian Hezbollah organization which operates in Lebanon. It is a well-organized, political-military organization that is one of the main actors on the political scene and affect on the security of Lebanon and the region as a whole. Bearing in mind the traditional hostility toward Israel, Hezbollah holds for "extended hand" of Iran in achieving interests in the region. How much Hezbollah is powerful system and how much it is a thorn in the eye of Israel, says the fact that in the last war of Israel and Lebanon in 2006, Hezbollah has shown that it is an equal player on the battlefield and that can stop one of the most organized and most experienced armies in combat region? The outcome of this conflict was further strengthened of Hezbollah's position on the political scene and security of the region and indirectly influenced the increase of power in Iran. The territory held by the IS in Syria and Iraq is an obstacle for regional connectivity of Iran in Lebanon, and Hezbollah, which is not in a favor for Israel. This would lead to a change in the current balance of power in the region and the change in the nature of security threats to Israel (Softic 2014). In addition, Israel has benefited from the IS and the fact that there is a reality that refers to the possible disintegration of Iraq and the creation of several smaller, weaker militarily sensitive and influential state. One of those states would probably be Kurdistan. The Israeli attitude toward the Kurds has the characteristics of "friendship" for several reasons. The fact that Israel and the Kurdish community have a common enemy - Turkey - and that over two hundred thousand Jews from Kurdistan lives in Israel is in favor of the previous claims. Israel buys significant amount of oil from Kurdistan. In addition, Israel is in favor of weakening pro-Iranian regime in Baghdad. This situation corresponds to Israeli interests because they can easily affect the destabilization of Turkey and secession of Kurds.

Analyzing the possible causes from the perspective of the interests of the regional powers, it is impossible to bypass Turkey, a country that is a bridge between Europe and Asia and has a significant impact on the security situation in the region. When it comes to Turkey's interests in the region, it is necessary to start from a few facts. Through Turkey pass important pipelines which transport oil from Iraq and Syria to Turkey and further to European countries. Through these pipelines, according to available information, transports oil exploiting by the IS and sell to Turkey at significantly lower prices than on the market (Kyriakou 2015). Part of the pipeline was built during the conflicts in Iraq and Syria by members of the IS, and their route runs mostly through Kurdistan. According to a former member of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and now a member of the Senate for Foreign Relations John Kyriakou, an autonomous area of Kurdistan allowed the construction of an oil pipeline across

their territories, with appropriate “tax”. According to his data, IS annually earns more than five hundred million dollars from the trade of oil transported by secret pipelines. It is not difficult to conclude that there is a significant financial benefit for both Kurdistan and Turkey (Israel 2014). In this case, we can glimpse the complexity of the security situation in the Middle East. Kurdistan and Turkey, although not in good terms because of the problems of Kurds in Turkey, the economic calculation is still ahead of all other interests. Bearing in mind the tensions with the Kurdish minority and the fact that it was the Kurds who are one of the most prominent opponents to IS on the field, it is direct Turkey's interest for IS to exist and function.

In a view of these facts indicates that IS “cooperates” with Kurdistan in one hand, while in the other wage war against Kurdish units in the field, the question is what is the role of the regional government of Kurdistan. According to Mr. Softic, IS has come to the government of Kurdistan as a salvation. During the conflict in Iraq, the Kurdish military formations, known as Peshmerga came into possession of significant territory around the city of Kirkuk, which Kurds do not intend to return to the regime in Baghdad (in this region is 1/3 of the Iraqi oil reserves). In addition, this development is supported by the undertaking the activities of Kurdish leaders aimed at the idea of forming their own state on the territory of Iraq. One of the Turkish interest for the development and further action of IS on the ground can be a migrant crisis caused by the conflicts in Syria and Iraq. Over the territory of Turkey goes the main corridor through which migrants move to Europe. Since the beginning of the migrant crisis in parts of Turkey where they focused reception centers, increased the prices of food, housing, transportation and clothing. It is estimated that Turkey because of these microeconomic changes caused by a migration crisis on a daily basis earns a significant amount of money. In addition, Turkey from the European Union received about four billion Euros for solving problems with immigrants. According to estimates, only one quarter of the amount was spent for this purpose. Given the above, it can be concluded that Turkey, directly or indirectly could influence the onset, development and operation of the Islamic state.

The third level of problem analysis refers to studying the possible impact of global forces on the formation and development of Islamic countries, principally the United States.

The United States faced big problems in engaging in Iraq. The main problem lies in the fact that they failed to solve the crisis only with military force. Under pressure from domestic public and possible strategies to avoid falling into even greater problems, the US has withdrawn from Iraq, leaving the regime of Prime Minister Maliki to independently lead the country. The newly formed Iraqi government, despite the fact that it came to power thanks to the US, refused to sign the agreement which provided for the retention of significant US military resources in Iraq. Some analysts see in this fact one of the reasons why the US administration rather quietly reacted to the emergence and development of the Islamic state. US policy which favored Shiite population had a negative impact on the relations between Shiites and Sunni, so that a significant percentage of the Sunni population greeted IS as liberators. One of the interests that the United States could have on the Middle East, the disintegration of Iraq and the establishment of several smaller countries. There is possible strategy of a US for the partition of Iraq in the area of Baghdad, Mosul and Basra as it was during the Ottoman Empire (Softic 2014). Assuming this is true, the United States had a motive to facilitate the formation and development of the IS. One of the significant factors that contributed to the strengthening of IS has been some kind of erroneous calculations of the

US when it comes to the functioning of these organizations against the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria. In the initial period of conflict, IS was one of the greatest enemies of the Assad regime, and in this development corresponded to the interests of the United States. Strengthening the IS and incompatibility of interests with the Syrian opposition caused the complexity of the situation. The Islamic State began conflict in Syria for their goals without taking into account the interests of the opposition. At the same time there was an unusual situation that the US and the official Syrian authorities have a common enemy who occupies an important role in a conflict that has become a concrete threat to those who have sought to take advantage of its geopolitical goals (Radosavljevic 2014). An important aspect of the study of possible causes of the emergence and development of Islamic State is one of the most severe consequences of the conflict in the Middle East. That is a huge exodus of people and their departure in European Union countries, especially to Germany. Even before conflicts in Syria and Iraq, there were wars in the Middle East and various crises, but never before did not happened a similar situation with the departure of the population from these areas to Europe in such numbers. Whether it was coincidence or not, time will tell, but here is set forth a hypothetical reference to this problem trying to connect to the problematic questions of this study. The European Union from the beginning of the migrant crisis was facing a number of problems and lack of efficiency and collective decision-making. The impossibility of defining a common policy and a joint approach, European Union got a derisive nickname “economic giant and a political dwarf”. Regarding the security, came out disunity, unwillingness and inadequacy of the European Union to tackle the problem of upcoming migrants. United States, regardless of their partnership with the European Union, see it as one of the main competitors when it comes to economic dominance in the world. Individually, the countries of the European Union, except to some extent Germany, can hardly compete with the US on any issue, but strong and united European Union is certainly a player to be respected. Germany, in the long term may face security challenges which bring migrants, principally terrorism. This situation might potentially weak Germany. Is it, in this case, that United States needed in the Middle East force capable to mobilize millions of people and direct them to Europe, principally to Germany? If so, then this can also be considered as one of the possible causes that led to the creation of the Islamic state.

When examining the possible interests of the United States for the creation and existence of IS it is important to note the fact that Russia and Syria have signed a contract worth more than four billion dollars in the defense industry, which aims to further modernize the Syrian army (Jagodić. 2014).

CONCLUSION

This article could not detect or reach to all the secret paths that indicate the possible causes and development of the Islamic state. It certainly was not possible, but the essence lies in the fact that it gives to the reader some of the possible lines of thinking when it comes to this issue. It can be concluded that the IS marks the beginning of 21st century in the Middle East with its organization and territory it controls. Many experts in the field of security agree in the statement that the organization has exceeded, by the methods of operation and unscrupulousness, all known terrorist organizations in human history. They are classed as a terrorist, but at the moment are they really only that? Undoubtedly, they use terrorism as a

method of action, but we must not neglect the fact that the IS "established" some kind of form of statehood on the territories they conquer. Those areas are not negligible, and what is more important from the security point of view, perhaps not even the final. Islamic states became regional, and one might say, and global reality which significantly affects the creation of the security situation in the region and beyond. Features presented in the article indicate the overall complexity of the security realities of the Middle East, which is reflected in the large number of actors, both at local, regional and global level. If we look upon contents of this work, it can be concluded that the IS was created and develop thanks to the patchwork of interests of most countries in the region, but also the major powers. The Islamic State is formed at the intersection of those interests. How complex is the situation with regard to the causes of the emergence and development of the Islamic State testifies statement of Igor Pankretanka, Chief Editor of "Modern Iran" which provides the names of the founders of the Islamic state, or as it follows: Jeffrey Feltman, a former US ambassador to Lebanon, Prince Bander bin Sultan, former head of the Saudi Arabia intelligence service, the Emir of Qatar, senior officials of the Turkish, British and French intelligence services. In this article the names are not important, but what is important is to point out the possible directions that can provide answers to questions relating to the causes of the Islamic state.

Analyzing the causes of the emergence and development of the IS, a number of situations that are seemingly paradoxical and contradictory can be found. The Islamic State now relies on a situation in which most of the regional powers and the United States corresponds to its existence. What may be worrying is the fact that the IS itself created conditions that not only as tool for achieving one's goals, but becomes an entity that defines its own interests. This begs the question of how the world and the region will react in the future on this and whether it will allow threats to their interests which, until yesterday, were supported activities of the Islamic state. There are many causes that influenced foundation and the existence of the Islamic state. For now, IS skillfully exploits the lack of 'critical mass' that would be able to start cutting down the roots of its existence. If this does not happen, IS could turn the organization into a true national system with problematic ideology which may adversely affect the security situation in the region and globally.

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FOLLOWING THE TRAIL OF SYRIAN REFUGEES IN EUROPE

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INTRODUCTION

The “refugee crises” emerged as a term created by the European Member States, which had to face the higher number of asylum seekers since the Second World War. In the end of 2015, Europe, led by the German chancellor, Angela Merkel, proclaimed more welcoming policies toward asylum seekers coming from war-zones, in particular Syrians; who were recognized as the most vulnerable and in-need of a safe haven. Despite of this step forward towards an increasing acceptance of refugees, statistics show that the number of Syrians arriving in Europe seeking international protection remains low compared with Syria’s neighboring countries, Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), between April 2011 and February 2016, Europe received less than one million (972,012) Asylum applications, while in the same period of time, Turkey registered almost three million (2,688,686) Syrian refugees, Lebanon more than a million (1,055,984) and finally, Jordan 637,859. Thus, all European Member States are currently hosting only around 22% of Syrians who are seeking protection, compared to Syria’s neighboring countries. Moreover, an aggressive reaction towards refugees welcoming policies coming from strong European Member States’ policy makers grew in Europe from the center and right-wing political parties, as well as from radical ideological groups.

Finally, the inability of the European Member States to reach an internal agreement in order to solve and overcome the limitations of the Dublin regulations brought them to seek Turkey’s help in order to limit the number of Asylum Seekers reaching the European coasts. The EU signed a controversial agreement with Turkey in March 2016, which had been defined by NGO’s, civil society, and European institutions as in contradiction with the European values. In fact, the EU aimed to discourage the influx of Asylum seekers by deporting asylum seekers who reach Greece, in exchange of the same number of refugees who are currently in Turkey. While heads of states negotiate and count numbers in order to achieve agreements, I will uncover personal stories from Syrian asylum seekers who are currently struggling for a dignified life in Turkey and Germany.

Five years of civil war in Syria caused, according to the UNHCR, more than eight million internally displaced persons. In this report I will present stories of Syrians, who I personally encountered, who could successfully escape their devastating civil war in their home country. My aim is to raise the voices of the few courageous young ladies and men,

who could leave behind death and destruction, moved by hope and aspiration to be able to start working and building a new future. Their desired and deserved new stable life is yet far from their present reality. On the one hand, those asylum seekers found themselves having to populate the streets of the biggest Turkish city, Istanbul, in order to collect some money to feed their hunger; Others, among the luckiest ones who could find a job, are constantly worried about their family, relatives and friends who are still facing a war back in Syria that is far reaching an end. Furthermore, their reunification with their families is considered highly difficult to be achieved. On the other hand, refugees perceive Europe as a promised land with high human rights standards and a land rich of opportunities. Unfortunately, the few asylum seekers who could make their way to the European Union are also facing many challenges. The reality that I could document in Berlin does not reflect the standards that the European Union claims to be based upon. Overcrowded shelters which do not function as a temporarily center, instead are hosting hundreds of people without being able to offer them basic rights, such as privacy and dignified life conditions; Christian missionaries who are trying to convert the most vulnerable segment of the population while promising them to receive, if converted, a legal status; and finally a long and uncertain bureaucratic system, are some of the difficulties that those refugees reported through their personal human stories.

TAKSIM SQUARE (ISTANBUL, TURKEY)

“Do you have five liras I am hungry?” We knew that we were in the European side of the biggest Turkish city. As soon as few liras went into the hand of a Syrian child, dozens more were coming. They all had their needs. Firya, a small head-covered thirteen years old girl, was invoking the clemency and goodness of Allah to receive a few coins. She was talking and walking with us. It was when, after telling her that we ran out of our money, she decided to put together all her savings and offer them to us that we invited her for dinner. Hers is the story of many Syrian refugee children. Firya lost her father during the war. She escaped Aleppo and the refugee camps in East Turkey with her mother and older brother, and made her way to Istanbul. Besides Arabic and Kurdish, now she speaks some Turkish, which she learned on the streets asking for money and talking to people. I was surprised to notice that she could not count or read. She was very comfortable telling us her story. Her little eyes started shining while remembering how much she used to enjoy going to school. She used to know how to read and write, but after five years of intense war and missed classes, she forgot everything. “People here (In Turkey) are very nice. They come to my home and ask my mother to send her poor daughter to school. But my mother always asks them to leave. She, as my Syrian teacher, does not want me to study in another country. They both believe that this will change my traditions.” Turkey is indeed offering education to asylum seekers and now AKP, the ruling party, despite the increasing opposition from other parties, such as the main liberal and historical Republican People Party, is trying to facilitate the life of hundreds of thousands of Syria by allowing them to work. “My mother will be back around 2 (AM!) Can you please talk to her and try to convince her to let me go to school?” Her mother is also trying to collect little money while selling tissues when her older brother found a poor-paid job as *simit* (Turkish bread) maker. The mother could not be convinced and Firya walked home with her ready for her only entertainment: an old television where she can watch Syrian programs during the few hours left of the night. Taksim, one of the symbol of the Turkish

city, which had been the scenario of many historical changes of the town, and in 2013 united the core of the Gezi Park protests, is now the number one destination for Syrian children and old women and men who are hoping to get some support from other Muslim brother and the few tourists, who are less numerous after the recent terrorist attack in Sultan Ahmed (Blue Mosque) area. Tired refugees are leaving the square with the first lights of the new day. Replacing them are workers and constructors of a mall and mosque in the huge square, which was the cause of huge popular protests only few years ago.

KADIKOY, ISTANBUL

We met Fade in Kadikoy, one of the centres of the Asiatic part of the city. He was wearing a suit and offered us a big smile. Fade reached Istanbul by plane only few months ago, but he is already working with a Syrian friend on a mobile phone application for Arabs who live in the city. This highly educated twenty-four years old boy would never leave Turkey for Europe. "I want to have opportunities, I want to work and create something. I do not want charity. I only want freedom. Turkish language is not easy, but the food here is delicious!", he said biting his *Balik Ekmek* (sandwich with fish) and showing us his beautiful smile. Fade could have been considered a privileged person in Syria. Coming from a very wealthy family he had the opportunity to study in the best universities in Damascus, but during the last years his privileges became a burden. "Having money in Syria now means troubles!" Fade was indeed arrested without any reason, except the Syrian government's need of the money. As soon as his family paid a huge sum to the authorities he was released, but the day after, his father was put in prison. He tells us that his family in Syria keeps paying and being arrested. Fade's main dream is now to make enough money as to be able to bring his little sister to Turkey. In the same night messages were arriving to us. Saleh, a courageous seventeen years old boy was writing from the ancient city of Izmir. He was ready to start his journey to his dreamed Europe, the land of civilization, which was opening its arms to the needy refugees. His dream and the money that his family could collect enabled him to leave the biggest refugee camp in Jordan, the isolated Zaatari camp. He decided for his only and hardest option: being smuggled again into Syria in order to, by doing so, reach Turkey and from there start his travel. He was fully aware of this dangerous journey. More than four thousands Syrian refugees already lost their life while facing the sea. "I gave the smugglers extra money (400 euro) in order to let me take a video of the journey in the boat because I know that I will die in the sea, at least my video will be published and it will reach many people so the world will understand what we are facing and will help us!" It was useless to tell him not to take the boat. Images of high waves, people shouting, children screaming, woman praying reached us during our dinner. Fade pointed to the plastic tray on the table emphasizing that he wish that those boats were at least as resistant and of the same quality of what they used to serve us the dinner with, emphasizing the poor material the smugglers boats are made from. Saleh had to return to Turkey. The waves were too big and the smugglers called the boat back. The second day, as he was ready to leave and make his last movie, the border police caught them. Saleh was sent back to the place which he tried to escape. He is alive sitting in Zaatari refugee camp, looking at the metal barrier surrounding them. Without money left, without hope for a better future...

ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE SEA

How would have it been for him in Europe? Did Europeans really finally understand and feel compassionate about those people suffering? Are they welcoming? Being born with a good passport made it very easy for me to go all the way to Germany, the country whose Prime Minister Angela Merkel surprised the world by announcing its new policies towards asylum seekers and its willingness to accept them, and to see myself what it is true under the dream.

GERMANY, EUROPE

Crossing cities and villages in the North of the country, I was astonished by the elder age of the German population. The need for Germany to accept young asylum seekers was evident: new work force composed by skilful and motivated youth escaping war and misery. Part of the German public understands this need while also being concerned of the families that those young boys want, as soon as possible, to bring to Germany. Issues of social security system, the different values and faiths are all alarm bells for Germans who still did not completely accept the high immigration that started more than forty years ago from Turkey. While many Turkish residents and now European citizens still preserve and speak mostly their own language and live in self-built Turkish communities within Germany, asylum seekers are going through German classes.

Fatima a Palestinian nineteen years old girl from Syria proudly showed me her German language book. "My teacher is very nice she is patient and she told me that one day I will speak perfect German." Fatima reached Berlin four month ago through the now well-known walking route that saw thousands of refugees crossing entire countries in order to reach the core of Europe. "I went to Turkey, Greece, Macedonia, Serbia, Hungary, Austria and then Germany. I never left my city before that!" The young Palestinian went all her way with her husband, a shy nineteen years old boy from the same refugee camp in Syria. Fatima had to leave behind her two years of university. She almost never lost any classes even during the worst day of conflict in her city. "I was walking for two hours to reach the classes. The way was difficult: soldiers, explosions, shooting and dead animals and body were always on the way." "Weren't you scarred? I wondered. "Swai" (a little bit) she answered. Fatima lives with five hundreds asylum seekers in a shelter twenty minutes walk from the Berlin *Hauptbahnhof* (central station). Shelters look like big white balloons. The authorities have facilitated them as a provisional arriving centre for the newcomers before being sent to more permanent housing in different cities of Germany. Although the maximum stay is supposed to be of one week, many asylum seekers are currently still in shelters for more than nine months. "The problem is the noise. The children are always crying and shouting. There is no privacy here." Fatima complained.

PROSELYTIZATION IN BERLIN

At the entrance of the shelter, the security staff registers all volunteers and refugees who are leaving and entering the place. Two young Germans arrived to the shelter in order to entertain by playing music and offer their support by working in the reception of the centre. Unfortunately, especially during weekends, Christian missionaries are the ones who, following what they believe is God wills, go to asylum seekers' centres offering their truths. As Mohammed, a Sudanese peace activist and now volunteer in different shelters in Berlin, pointed out, missionaries are delighted while explaining to groups of unfamiliar refugees the advantages of leaving their own religion. "If you convert your asylum case will be easier. Christians get their documents in only few weeks. Almost all Syrians and Iranians are becoming Christians. If you choose the good religion, Germany will know that you are a good person and will help you." Refugees highly respect the authority of the locals. They are extremely helpful and polite to each and any volunteer in the shelter. If asked to seat and listen they will do it. If given the wrong information, as they do not dispose of any other source of knowledge, they will believe it. They constitute nowadays the perfect target for all religious people. They are in need and they are many. For this reason, especially during weekends, European religious fanatics come together for their mission. Sami comes from Syria, but now has piercings and a very much Berliner outlet. He complained to me about the pressures that he had to face. "During Christmas the situation was especially bad. Religious people felt the duty to come and talk to us. They wanted to convince us to accept their beliefs. They were telling me that my life in Germany it would have been easier if I converted. That I should not be afraid because all the refugees are embracing Christianity now." Sami is atheists and this gave him strength to counter the missionaries' propaganda. "If I do not believe, do not ask me to change the name of God!" On the other hand, Sami was aware of the pressure and suffering of religious people. He witnessed many of the approaches of religious people to asylum seekers in the shelters.

This manipulation of a highly vulnerable group is not the only challenge that refugees have to face in Europe. Asylum seekers are not allowed to cook their meals. Germans must do it for them. Portions of food without salt and flavour are served them every day. And every day the leftovers are almost equal as the amount of food prepared. As Marwan pointed out "here (in Germany) we are not allowed to do anything." Marwan is a Syrian boy who reached Germany three month ago after spending two years in Turkey. He speaks basic Turkish and explained me the challenges that he is facing in Berlin. While in Turkey he could find small jobs. In Germany, as he expressed: "we must study for everything even if we want to sell water, the authorities will ask you: "Did you study to do that?"

EUROPE, NO THANK YOU

Iraqis, but sometimes also Syrians, prefer to go back to their countries, to face the risks of being targeted by terrorist attack and to live in the middle of a brutal war rather than to remain in Germany. The images of those people packing their few belongings should be an alarm for Europe. The dreams of refugees had been broken by the not welcoming reality. Long journeys did not mean a new beginning, but a long waiting list. Or rather an interminable time, which asylum seekers do not know how to spend. Imposition of other

faiths, a highly bureaucratic system and the deprivation to carry on any simple tasks related to their life are all pressures on top of them. The far right is increasing the number of supporters and rallies spreading hate towards the newcomers. Politicians from the entire spectrum seem more concerned with their electorate than for improving the life conditions of those courageous people who escaped war and destruction. The creation of Europe had been a brave and dynamic move in order to build from the destruction of the World War. Europe stands due to its values and rights. Europe cannot afford to be passive. Europe could do much better, but unfortunately it seems that it is trying to do even worse.




Picture 1: Photo courtesy of Veronica Bertozzi: Shelter outside, Berlin.



Picture 2: Photo courtesy of Veronica Bertozzi: Shelter outside, Berlin.



Picture 3: Photo courtesy of Veronica Bertozzi: Shelter inside, Berlin.



Picture 4: Photo courtesy of Veronica Bertozzi: Shelter inside, Berlin.



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BETWEEN DAVID AND GOLIATH: WHERE DID WE LOSE R2P BETWEEN LIBYA AND SYRIA?

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Only few years ago, the idea of “responsibility to protect” was accepted with the admiration. After the UN Security Council unanimously agreed to apply it directly in the case of Libya and few more cases have gone in that direction (Cote d’Ivoire, Yemen, South Sudan etc.) even the greatest skeptics became doubtful on their perception and started seeing the international community with new eyes - as an actor for global security that is determinate to stop mass atrocities, no matter who ever stands still on the side of the oppressive regimes. Although there have been grievances and disagreements about the way the whole process in Libya was conducted, and despite the fact that the embargo was obviously broken, legitimacy was given through the idea of humanity, and that was a justification for overcoming procedural challenges. The Responsibility to protect (R2P) was considered to become an emerging norm of the international law and order that would deter the states of irresponsible and tyrannical sovereignty.

However, as David Bowie sang, pretty things are going to hell. After the civil war in Syria got serious dimensions, the international community needed some time to decide even to condemn the violence. Although the position of Syria is considered to be more complicated geopolitically and religiously, the violence that occurred and the number of civilians that died or lost their home, or survived stress and tragedy, must not be ignored. Put in between the devil and the deep blue sea, the international community remained divided, and further catastrophe is knocking on her door.

What happens in Syria will undermine even the moral arguments of further imposing of R2P doctrine, no matter that some experts have tried to explain that imposing R2P in Syria would have counter effect. Same did some of the officials. However, I personally believe that the way R2P was (not) implemented in Syria, on a doctrinal and scientific level will have the same effects for R2P as the Bankovich case had for the extraterritorial applicability of human rights. Speaking about pragmatism, it is understandable that the powerful should prefer to declare that we should forget history and look forward. But, for the weak ones, forgetting is not a wise choice.

I can completely agree with the UN Secretary General that violence, like water, comes in waves. But, I am currently doubtful of the commitment of all of us as a humanity and international community as a whole, of stopping it. We have failed as humanity. The international community is faced with the challenge of the validity of her own existence that has arisen, not to be forgotten, after another war catastrophe.

R2P is a doctrine born of good intentions, but we must not forget that the road to hell is paved with good intentions as well. We must also keep in mind that selective justice can be the greatest injustice imposed. Keeping this into mind, we have faced a situation where while officials in Paris, London, and Washington were congratulating one another for a job well done in Libya, in the UN Security Council, Russia and China were vetoing, and Brazil and India were abstaining from, the imposition of far milder, nonmilitary sanctions against Syria.

This, however, does nothing to help suffering Syrians and could plunder R2P's promise to build more secure world. In addition, it poses another question to those who preach that reform of the UN is a must: that nothing unless the political will is an instrument of change. Any system would not work out if honest will is not imposed. And, as we could see so far from the lessons learnt by the League of Nations, if the will of all authors is not included, it is not a system that can survive the challenges.

Reaching consensus is not a technical problem- it is whether we can unanimously agree to condemn what is wrong and support what is right. The selectivity of the concept's application has already opened it up to criticism from those parts of the international community who see in R2P another justification for western interference in the developing world's internal political affairs. If the international community does not find a way to resolve these cases, working within framework of the R2P principle, the alternative is a return to the bad old days of Rwanda and Srebrenica. Furthermore, what is extremely important is the fact that if R2P was developed and applied properly, it would have an effect of deterrence to those governments and rulers that would intent to act or already act with their populations in the manner that is inappropriate. On the other hand, inconsistent usage of the doctrine would led to insecurity for those rulers who will get doubtful about the honest idea of humanity and security that are the cornerstones of moral legitimacy of R2P, and will take it as another manifestation of the so called "hypocrisy of the West". No one will be able to stop them from, let say it that way, their right of self-defense in case of invasion- even acquiring nuclear weapons is not excluded. The UN Charter gives the two exceptions of the prohibition of the use of force, but does impose clear guidance. Developing of clear principles of the R2P, and even accepting and including within the R2P concept proposed, can lead to better normative framework and legal certainty.

And to conclude, it is never too late to do at least something, even when we speak about Syria. Too many people suffered and unpleasant example is already set, although we are aware that we live in a world whose problems overcome the national borders very easy.

The R2P was put on three pillars. That makes me believe that there is still time to change at least something in Syria and save the day. Otherwise, the conclusion would be nothing more than: RIP R2P.

The price of the delayed and inconsistent international commitment was unfortunately paid on the streets of Paris and he airport of Brussels. The migrant crisis cannot be resolved by any political agreement, except for resolving the very source of it. This could be a chance for reviving R2P - this time, redefining the concept and including also non state actors. And giving a chance a society to be rebuilt. This might sound too idealistic – but this is the only long term solution that can actually work for everyone. The contemporary understanding of the human rights is indivisible of the human security. Human security is indivisible from the protection of citizens of their own governments. It is a precondition for more secure world. And it is a responsibility of the international community. We still have a chance to show our dedication and make a step forward. As Tolkin says, not all those who wander are lost.



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Photo courtesy of Simona Kalica

MISGUIDED STEPS



About the Author:



Simona Kalica is 19 year old girl from Bitola (Republic of Macedonia). Future lawyer although forever an artist in her soul. In her free time she draws, although she is into amateur photography for the last 4 years. Simona is a big fan of art and all things hidden, unusual and unique. As a young photographer she has shown her talent in many group exhibitions according with “Instagramers” with “Photo of the week” in according with the mobile operator “One” along with other fellow passionate Instagram artists which lasted for 52 weeks. “To be creative you need bravery” is her life motto and she believes one day she will conquer the world with her photos.

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